The short version
- The flaw. Docker Hub reassigned a user's personal access token (PAT), a secret used to authenticate tools and workflows, to another account without changing the secret or asking consent. The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-105445 and rated critical; it existed from 26 August 2024 until 30 September 2026.
- The impact. Within a token's permissions, the flaw let one user pull, push or delete images in another user's repositories and in organisations that user could reach. Docker says it gave no access to the Docker Hub web interface and could not be used to change passwords, email addresses or two-factor settings.
- Docker's review. Docker examined about 304,000 pushes made with transferred tokens and said every one went to the converted organisation or its named owner. It treated all transferred tokens as possibly affected because its registry logs record when a token is used, not whether it exists.
- Notification. Docker emailed affected users and organisation owners on 2 October and deactivated the transferred tokens on 8 October, except those their owners asked to keep. It describes the group only as a limited number of users and has not said how many were involved.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 26 August 2024 | The flaw is introduced, when converting a personal account into an organisation begins reassigning the account's tokens to the new owner without rotating the secret or seeking consent. |
| 22 April 2025 | Docker's documentation gains a note stating that naming a user as organisation owner will transfer that user's tokens to the new owner. |
| 30 September 2026 | Docker receives a report of the flaw from two researchers, confirms it and deploys a fix to production in under four hours; the documentation note is removed. |
| 2 October 2026 | Docker emails users whose accounts received transferred tokens, and separately the owners of the organisations involved. |
| 8 October 2026 | Docker deactivates the transferred tokens it identified, except those whose owners asked to retain them. |
| 12 October 2026 | Docker publishes its security advisory on the flaw. |
| 13 October 2026 | The CVE record is published with a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.4, and the flaw is reported publicly. |
How the token transfer worked
Docker Hub cannot move a repository between accounts. A user instead converts a personal account into an organisation that keeps the same name and must name an existing account as its owner. According to Docker's advisory, that conversion changed the owner recorded for the account's personal access tokens and left each token's secret unchanged. According to Docker and the researchers who reported the flaw, the named owner was neither asked to confirm the change nor notified.
An attacker could create a token on an account they controlled, convert that account into an organisation and name a target user as owner; the token then authenticated at the registry as that target, at whatever permission level was chosen when the token was created. Peter Molnar and Krisztian Hozak of mptrdev.com, who reported the flaw and named it GhostPat, reproduced it on consenting test accounts, logging in as the target and pushing to its repository and to an organisation it belonged to.
Docker's documentation described the transfer for about 17 of the roughly 25 months the flaw was open. The note added in April 2025 was removed on 30 September, minutes after the time Docker gives for the fix, according to The Hacker News, which reviewed the public documentation history.
What Docker checked and told customers
Docker confirmed the report and fixed the flaw on Docker Hub itself, so customers have no update to install. The CVE record published on 13 October gives the flaw a CVSS 4.0 severity score of 9.4. Docker rated it critical because the access includes publishing images under a legitimate name, which it treated as a software supply chain risk.
Docker compared every account conversion made while the flaw was open with registry logs and token records, looking for a token used under more than one identity. It examined all pushes made with a transferred token, about 304,000, and said each went to a repository belonging to the converted organisation or its named owner; in most cases both accounts belonged to the same person or team. It also inspected the highest-risk public images without running them and found no malware or tampering.
Because registry logs record when a token is used rather than whether it exists, a transferred token that was never used left no trace, so Docker treated every token transferred during the window as possibly affected. The advisory gives results for pushes only; it does not say what the review found for pulls or for deletions, including pulls from private repositories.
Supply chain concern and response
The risk Docker describes is impersonation at the registry: a token could publish images that appear to come from a trusted account, which is why the flaw was rated critical even though the web interface and account settings were out of reach. The sources do not link this flaw to any malicious image. The Hacker News notes that in March and April attackers used stolen publisher credentials to push malicious Trivy and KICS images to the publishers' own Docker Hub repositories; no source says that episode and CVE-2026-105445 are connected.
Docker says it no longer transfers tokens when an account is converted and now requires consent before a user is named an organisation owner, notifying that user when it happens. Users who received no notification should assume they were not affected and need to do nothing, Docker says. It advises users to review their tokens, revoke any they do not recognise and use organisation access tokens rather than one person's personal token for organisation automation.
What is not known yet
- Whether any transferred token was used to pull from a private repository or to delete images, which Docker's advisory does not report on.
- How many users, organisations and tokens received transferred tokens; Docker describes the notified group only as a limited number of users.
- Whether an unused transferred token, invisible in registry logs, was ever held by someone other than its owner.
- Who, if anyone, created accounts and conversions in order to exploit the flaw before 30 September.
- Whether the affected users and organisations have finished checking the integrity of images published from their accounts.
What to do
If you use Docker Hub
- Open Account settings, then Personal access tokens, and review every token with its creation and last-used date.
- Revoke any token you did not create or no longer use; whoever creates a token also chooses its description.
- Check the account switcher for any organisation you do not remember joining.
- If you received Docker's 2 October email, rotate the tokens it lists and trace each image you publish back to the build run that produced it.
If you own an organisation on a Docker Team or Docker Business subscription
- Review activity logs in Docker Home, which keeps 30 days, for pushed tags and the token behind each push.
- Replace individual personal access tokens in organisation automation with organisation access tokens.
For everyone else
- If Docker sent you no notification, Docker says you were not exposed and have nothing to do.
- Keep automation on credentials the organisation owns rather than one person's token, so a change of account owner cannot silently move access.
Update log
- First published.
Sources
New incident reports by email
One email a week with the reports published since the last one.