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Lazarus uses post-quantum cryptography in FlashHole South Korea campaign

Kaspersky attributes Operation FlashHole, a South Korean espionage campaign, to North Korea's Lazarus Group and says it has hit at least three organisations since July 2025. The attackers use phishing and GitHub-hosted pages, abuse INISAFE CrossWeb EX, a mandatory banking security tool, and protect payload delivery with post-quantum cryptography.

· First published

The short version

  • The campaign. Kaspersky attributes Operation FlashHole to the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group and says at least three South Korean organisations have been targeted since July 2025. It names the software, construction and wired communication equipment manufacturing sectors and suspects more victims.
  • The entry point. Kaspersky says targets were sent spear-phishing emails linking to fabricated but relevant sites, such as portfolio and résumé pages tailored to each target. The Hacker News reports that the precise initial access vector is unclear, with signs pointing to malicious GitHub pages, one of which hosted a senior network appliance developer's résumé.
  • The infection chain. The pages trigger INISAFE CrossWeb EX, a mandatory banking security tool, which launches the legitimate Windows binary fsquirt.exe and loads TechHub. TechHub and related tools fetch further malware, including ClientHub, LPEClient and Cubridge.
  • Payload protection. LPEClient receives ML-KEM-1024 public keys from command-and-control infrastructure, derives shared keys and decrypts incoming payloads. Kaspersky says the group uses post-quantum cryptography to hide later payloads.
  • Unanswered questions. The sources do not say how many organisations were affected in total or whether data was stolen. The three reported companies are not named.

Timeline

DateEvent
July 2025Kaspersky says FlashHole attacks began.
21 October 2026BleepingComputer publishes Kaspersky's analysis of FlashHole.
27 October 2026The Hacker News publishes further details of the campaign and its malware toolset.

How the chain runs

Kaspersky describes a complex chain that begins with spear-phishing emails linking to fabricated but relevant sites such as portfolio and résumé pages. The Hacker News reports that the precise initial access vector is unclear, with signs pointing to malicious GitHub pages, one of which hosted the résumé of a senior network appliance developer. The page triggers INISAFE CrossWeb EX, which runs fsquirt.exe; that loads TechHub, which retrieves more malware from GitHub.

TechHub installs TouchHub, which sideloads TOUCHSHIFT for persistence. A second TechHub instance fetches ClientHub, which loads LPEClient into memory; LPEClient then delivers Cubridge. Cubridge can run commands, manage files, take screenshots and load plugins, and Kaspersky also reports tools that target Chromium browsers for credentials, cookies and browsing history. ClientHub is a previously undocumented backdoor with HTTPS and Dropbox API variants.

Post-quantum payload delivery

LPEClient asks the command-and-control (C2) server for four 1,568-byte blocks containing ML-KEM-1024 public keys. It generates four shared key and ciphertext pairs, encrypts the ciphertexts with GOST and sends them through ClientHub. The shared secrets key Threefish, which decrypts the response carrying parameters and an executable. LPEClient loads the final Cubridge payload reflectively into memory. ML-KEM is a NIST-approved post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism, and Kaspersky says its use shows an intent to hide subsequent payloads.

Targets and attribution

Kaspersky attributes the campaign to the Lazarus Group, which it links to North Korea. It says at least three South Korean companies were hit, in software, construction and wired communication equipment manufacturing, and suspects the true number is higher. Kaspersky links FlashHole to its earlier Operation SyncHole and to broader Cascade Hole activity with medium-to-high confidence. The Hacker News reports that SyncHole was documented in April 2025 and that Lazarus has abused South Korean financial security software before.

What is not known yet

  • The exact initial access vector for the three reported victims.
  • The total number of organisations compromised; Kaspersky suspects more than the three it identified.
  • Whether any files, browser credentials, cookies or other data were stolen from the victims.
  • Whether the three reported companies have confirmed the compromise or issued their own advisories.
  • Whether the ML-KEM-protected payloads have prevented defenders from recovering or analysing the malware.

What to do

If you use INISAFE CrossWeb EX

  1. Open banking and government services by typing the address, not by following links in unsolicited messages.
  2. Check with Initech for current guidance and the supported version; the sources do not name a fixed release.

If you run IT in a South Korean target sector

  1. Hunt for TechHub, TouchHub, TouchShift, ClientHub, LPEClient and Cubridge on endpoints and in memory.
  2. Review logs for CrossWeb EX starting fsquirt.exe outside normal Bluetooth file-transfer use.
  3. Check Chromium browsers for signs of credential, cookie and history theft.

For everyone else

  1. Do not open unsolicited links to résumé or portfolio pages; verify the sender through a separate channel.
  2. Report suspected spear-phishing to your security team.
  3. Do not rely on file scanning alone; monitor process behaviour and outbound encrypted traffic for payload retrieval.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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