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Sansec: 953 online stores, mostly on Magento, infected with JavaScript loader

Sansec says 953 online stores, most of them running Magento, have been infected with a JavaScript loader that hides its final payload from security scanners. The campaign has run since July 2025 and has used five loader domains.

· First published

The short version

  • The campaign. Sansec counts 953 infected online stores, most running Magento, with loader code injected into their pages since July 2025. Five loader domains have been used, the newest from October 2026.
  • How stores were hit. Sansec attributes 471 injections to the PolyShell flaw (CVE-2026-48356) and file uploads on another 102 stores to PolyShell or SessionReaper (CVE-2025-54236). In one case, attackers added a rogue administrator account and used it to inject the code.
  • Evasion. The loader fingerprints visitors so the payload goes only to real shoppers and scanners receive nothing. Sansec has not captured the final payload; earlier versions served crypto-themed scripts, including one imitating the Ledger wallet brand.
  • Patching alone did not stop it. One store on Magento 2.4.7-p10 with no missing core patches received the newest loader an hour after a scan found it clean. A rogue admin account and a backdoor had been found on it in September.
  • What owners are told to check. Sansec advises store owners to look for the loader, unexpected CMS blocks, rogue admin accounts and backdoors, then clean up, change all passwords and apply the latest patches.

Timeline

DateEvent
July 2025The campaign begins; the first loader domain, manulfie[.]click, is seen.
December 2025The neswnsssn[.]click loader domain is first seen.
March 2026The lanhd6549tdhse[.]top loader domain is first seen.
March 2026Sansec attributes 471 store injections to the PolyShell flaw (CVE-2026-48356).
May 2026manulfie[.]click and neswnsssn[.]click expire and are registered again, now on a domain parking service's nameservers.
June 2026The additionalver[.]com loader domain is first seen.
August-October 2026Sansec still finds the manulfie[.]click loader on 9 stores and the neswnsssn[.]click loader on 6.
16 September 2026A scan finds a rogue administrator account on a store that is later reinfected.
24 September 2026A backdoor is found on the same store.
6 October 2026The deepveindrilling[.]com loader domain is registered.
7 October 2026On one store, the CMS block is switched to the deepveindrilling[.]com loader.
23 October 2026A patched Magento 2.4.7-p10 store receives the new loader at 16:46 UTC, an hour after a clean scan.
26 October 2026Sansec's findings are published.

What happened

Sansec, a Dutch e-commerce security firm, says it has counted 953 infected online stores, most of them running Magento. The code sits in Magento CMS blocks, the database records that render static content on storefront pages, and runs when a shopper opens an affected page. Sansec dates the campaign to July 2025.

The loader contacts the attacker's server, which decides whether the request comes from a real shopper or a security scanner; according to Sansec, scanners get nothing back. Two loader versions have been observed. One stores code in the browser's localStorage so it runs again on later visits; the other adds fingerprinting so only genuine shoppers receive the payload.

Five loader domains have been used: manulfie[.]click from July 2025, neswnsssn[.]click from December 2025, lanhd6549tdhse[.]top from March 2026, additionalver[.]com from June 2026 and deepveindrilling[.]com from October 2026. Sansec found the newest domain in the CMS blocks of 83 stores, 60 of which had run earlier versions. Sansec Watch logged about 52,000 reports of browsers loading additionalver[.]com.

How the stores were compromised

Sansec attributes 471 injections to PolyShell (CVE-2026-48356), a Magento flaw, and says files were uploaded through PolyShell or SessionReaper (CVE-2025-54236) on another 102 stores. In one case, PolyShell webshells disguised as PNG images sat in a media directory beside the additionalver[.]com loader in a CMS block; Sansec says that store still lacked APSB26-73, Adobe's PolyShell fix.

In one other case, a store was compromised to add a rogue administrator account, which was then used to inject the code. Sansec found that rogue administrator on a Magento 2.4.7-p10 store on 16 September and a backdoor on it on 24 September. The same store received the deepveindrilling[.]com loader at 16:46 UTC on 23 October, an hour after a scan found it clean, even though it had no missing core patches. Sansec does not say whether attackers edit existing CMS blocks or create new ones.

Payload and wider context

Sansec has not captured the final payload. Earlier loader versions sent visitors to crypto-themed scripts, including one imitating the Ledger wallet brand. Early iterations used Keitaro, an advertising analytics platform, as a traffic distribution system that returned a payload, a redirect or nothing depending on the visitor; the newest domain folds the bot filtering into the loader itself. A request from a Windows desktop visitor to the earlier domain only set a 24-hour cookie marking the visitor, according to Sansec.

The Hacker News also mentions PHP2Shell, two critical PHP flaws (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619) that have drawn widespread exploitation attempts, as a backdrop to its report. Neither source connects those flaws to the store infections.

What is not known yet

  • Who is operating the campaign. No source attributes it to a named group or country.
  • What the final payload does. Sansec has not captured it.
  • How many shoppers received the payload, and whether any customer or payment data was taken.
  • Which platforms the infected stores outside Magento run. The sources say only that most of the 953 run Magento.
  • How the rogue administrator account on the patched store was first obtained. Sansec reports finding it but not how it was created.

What to do

If you run a Magento or Adobe Commerce store

  1. Search the cms_block and cms_page tables for the five loader domains and for unexpected entries, and remove anything you did not add.
  2. Look for rogue administrator accounts and backdoors, including files disguised as images in pub/media directories.
  3. Apply Adobe's fix for PolyShell (APSB26-73) and the SessionReaper patch, and follow the vendor advisory for other core patches.
  4. After cleaning, change all passwords and enforce strong passwords on administrator accounts.

For everyone else

  1. Treat crypto or wallet prompts on online stores as suspicious: earlier loader versions served crypto-themed scripts, including one imitating the Ledger wallet brand.
  2. Do not treat a clean patch scan as proof a site is clean. The patched store in this campaign was reinfected through an administrator account an hour after a scan found nothing.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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