The short version
- The breach. Optimizely says an attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Web Experimentation product and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. According to socket.dev, the company places the flaw in the Experimentation account signup flow; the code went into each project's custom JavaScript field, so snippets served from the vendor's own content delivery network carried it to visitors.
- What the code did. The payload replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the attacker's own and, from 13:43 UTC on 16 November, captured card number, expiry date and CVV from sites' own forms; it also took cookies and page screenshots after an address swap. On iPhones and iPads it loaded exploit chains known as Coruna, for iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1, and DarkSword, for iOS 18.4 to 18.7.
- Scale. Report URI checked 1,611 snippets and found the code in 188, belonging to 178 organisations, and says the real number is likely higher. The list includes CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, plus Optimizely's own site and login page; 32 of the sites were finance or banking.
- The vendor response. Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page, on X and in a technical advisory. It says the vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code removed and affected customers contacted directly; socket.dev reports that it also revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. Report URI says every infected snippet in the set it observed had been cleaned by 23:11 UTC on 16 November.
- Money taken, and the limits of the evidence. Report URI says the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 16 November; StepSecurity puts the total at about $6,600 and notes the chain does not show which transfers came from victims. Hudson Rock says the evidence does not establish a zero-day or a successful compromise of a device.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 17 Sep | The injector linked to the campaign first appears on Turkish sites, according to Report URI. |
| 13 Nov | The earliest observation of a loader in scripts from Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly, which led to the same iOS-targeting infrastructure, according to Hudson Rock. |
| 16 Nov | At 04:21 UTC the first injection is seen, in the BBC's snippet. |
| 16 Nov | The Internet Archive captures a copy of track.js at 08:08:15 UTC, according to socket.dev, which says the relationship between this capture and the reported builds is unconfirmed. |
| 16 Nov | At 13:43 UTC a card skimmer is added to the payload. |
| 16 Nov | Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC a Coruna exploit frame is added for every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier. |
| 16 Nov | A mass cleanup begins at about 20:40 UTC; by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still carries the code. |
| 16 Nov | By 23:11 UTC every infected snippet in Report URI's observed set has been cleaned, according to socket.dev. |
| 17 Nov | Optimizely posts an incident notice at 01:02 UTC saying the flaw is fixed; it confirms the incident in a statement and a technical advisory, saying the vulnerable path is blocked, the code removed and customers contacted directly. |
How the code reached visitors
Optimizely Web Experimentation is used for A/B testing and personalisation. Customer sites embed a snippet that loads from cdn.optimizely.com, updates whenever a setting changes and runs an optional field of custom code called Project JavaScript. The attacker wrote a loader into that field in many projects and left the rest of each snippet alone, so the snippets kept arriving from the vendor's own domain under its certificate. Sites that serve the snippet from their own domain were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
The loader came in three versions. Most snippets loaded track.js from an attacker domain directly; one hid that address in base64 so a text search for the domain would miss it; another carried a full copy of the payload to run if the domain was blocked. Report URI linked an injector used in the campaign to Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts since late last week, and to Turkish sites from 17 September; Hudson Rock reported the earliest observation of a loader in Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly scripts on 13 November, leading to the same iOS-targeting infrastructure. How the code reached those scripts is not known.
Optimizely has said the attacker exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow, according to socket.dev, and that it patched it, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. The company said the vulnerable path is blocked, the injected code was removed, and customers have been contacted directly. Report URI says every infected snippet in the set it observed was cleaned by 23:11 UTC on 16 November.
What the payload did
track.js replaced cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the attacker's in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. StepSecurity found it swaps only an address that passes its chain's checksum and sits near a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send. Socket.dev's static analysis of one sample found checksum checks for Bitcoin and Tron candidates but only a prefix and length test for Ethereum-style addresses, plus a copy handler that can rewrite clipboard text without a prompt.
A card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC on 16 November. It captured the card number, expiry date and CVV submitted through a site's own form fields and sent them to the attacker's server. It could not read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe such as Stripe's hosted fields or Adyen's. Cookies and a page screenshot were sent only after an address swap, and cookies marked HttpOnly could not be read.
On iPhones and iPads the loader fetched boot.js from .icu domains and opened an exploit chain in a hidden frame: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and for iOS 26 a chain that so far only collects device details. Coruna targets iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1 and DarkSword iOS 18.4 to 18.7. Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC the attacker added a Coruna frame to every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier; those pages reload every 60 seconds.
Who is affected and what is not established
Report URI checked 1,611 snippets and found the code in 188, belonging to 178 organisations, and says the true figure is probably higher because it could only check the snippets it found in time. The list includes CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock, plus Optimizely's own site and login page; 32 of the sites were finance or banking. A site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised.
Smartsheet's script was cleaned and then re-infected with a hidden version of the code, which Report URI says shows the attacker still had access at that point. Hudson Rock confirmed links to the exploit-kit infrastructure but said the evidence does not establish a zero-day, a successful device compromise or collection of device data by later stages. Optimizely has not said how many customers were affected.
Report URI says the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC on 16 November, all within roughly nine hours. StepSecurity put the total at about $6,600 and noted that two of the addresses were in use before the injections began, so the chain does not show which transfers came from victims. Report URI says it cannot see how many credit cards were skimmed, how many cookies or screenshots were stolen, or how many iOS devices were infected.
Update: further detail on the injected code
An unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Experimentation and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects on 16 November 2026, according to Optimizely. The injected code then ran in the browsers of visitors to those customers' sites.
Report URI says the malicious script served visitors of 178 organisations and was rebuilt 26 times during the day. It dropped a kit able to take payment card data, cookies and screenshots, and to replace cryptocurrency payment addresses with the attacker's own.
The same sites also served zero-click exploit code, tracked as DarkSword and Coruna, that chains about half a dozen known flaws in outdated Apple iPhone and iPad devices to take full control of them.
What is not known yet
- How the flaw in the signup flow worked, and what an attacker had to do to reach other customers' projects through it.
- Whether the attacker retains any access to Optimizely accounts, projects or snippets after the token revocation and access resets.
- How many payment cards were skimmed, and how many cookies and screenshots reached the attacker.
- Whether any iPhone or iPad was actually compromised by the Coruna or DarkSword chains.
- How the loader got into the Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly scripts, and who is behind the campaign.
What to do
If you use Optimizely Web Experimentation
- Open the Project JavaScript in every project and the custom code in every experiment, and look for 1688360, atob( or any script you did not write; the atob( check finds the base64 version of the loader.
- Review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to your account, and rotate their credentials.
- If your own forms take card details, treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed.
- Treat session tokens or other secrets kept in cookies without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate them.
If you run a site that loads third-party scripts
- Decide whether experimentation and personalisation scripts need to run on payment, account and other sensitive pages.
- Do not rely on blocking the attacker's domain alone, because some poisoned snippets carried the full payload inline.
For everyone else
- Check a crypto address before you send funds to it, including one copied from a web page, because the clipboard can be rewritten in transit.
- Do not treat a script as trustworthy just because it loads from a well-known vendor's content delivery network.
Update log
- Added the Krebs on Security account of the injected code.
- Added Optimizely's statement that the flaw was in its Experimentation account signup flow, and Report URI's confirmation that every infected snippet it observed was cleaned by 23:11 UTC on 16 November.
- Added Optimizely's statement that it contained the incident, blocked the vulnerable path, removed the injected code and contacted customers directly, and Report URI's finding that 32 finance or banking sites were affected.
- Added Optimizely's status page and X confirmation, Hudson Rock's finding that Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute-ly scripts also delivered a loader from 13 November, and its caution that blocking the attacker's domain may not suffice.
- First published.
Sources
- Attackers Used Optimizely to A/B Test Malware on Top Websites
- Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Distributes Malware Across Global Brands
- Website management platform Optimizely confirms hackers put malicious code into customer sites
- Optimizely Vulnerability Exploited to Serve Malware on Major Websites
- Hijacked Optimizely Scripts Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploit Kits to CNN, BBC and Zoom Visitors
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