The short version
- The tampering. Someone with access to a contributor's GitHub account replaced the download archives on five existing OVHcloud CLI releases, v0.11.0 to v0.15.0, with a build designed to read secrets from disk. OVHcloud says the source code, release tag and build pipeline were not modified.
- The window. The swapped files were reachable only briefly on 19 October. The Hacker News puts the exposure at 12:47 to 14:21 UTC; OVHcloud's Octave Klaba, as reported by BleepingComputer, gives 14:47 to 16:21.
- Who is exposed. Installs made in that window through the official install script, a release-page download, an unpinned CI fetch or the CLI's own upgrade command may be malicious. Homebrew installs, go install, source builds and Docker images were not affected.
- The response. OVHcloud removed the swapped files, published v0.16.0 as an immutable release and enabled GitHub's release immutability setting. Klaba told users to change all secrets on the disk, and the company promised a detailed postmortem.
- The attribution claim. OpenSourceMalware says the attack was likely part of a GlassWorm operation and that the hijacked account had been compromised for more than half a year. OVHcloud has not attributed the incident.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 5 March | OpenSourceMalware says the later-hijacked GitHub account shows a scripted history rewrite in its public repositories. |
| 14 Apr-16 Sep | OVHcloud publishes the five CLI releases that were later altered, v0.11.0 to v0.15.0. |
| 13 Oct | The build uploaded to GitHub is compiled from an untagged commit dated 13 October. |
| 19 Oct, 12:47-14:21 UTC | Swapped archives are live on GitHub, according to The Hacker News. |
| 19 Oct, 14:47-16:21 | Klaba's account of the same period, reported by BleepingComputer: release appears, then is detected and blocked after a customer reports it. |
| 19 Oct | OVHcloud publishes v0.16.0 that evening as an immutable release with a signed attestation. |
How the release files were replaced
OVHcloud had not enabled GitHub's release immutability option, which locks the files and tag attached to a release. Without it, an account with write access can delete a release's files and upload new ones under the same names; the download URL does not change. The attacker put a build made from a later, untagged commit directly onto releases published between 14 April and 16 September. The source code, the release tag and the CI/CD pipeline were untouched, and the release workflow never ran.
On v0.15.0, six files were swapped: the macOS Intel and ARM archives, the Linux x86_64 and ARM64 archives, the Windows x86_64 archive, and checksums.txt, so the published hashes matched the new binaries. Those six files have since been removed from v0.11.0 to v0.14.0 as well. Linux i386, Windows i386, Windows ARM64 and WebAssembly builds were left alone. Klaba said the option is now enabled and the pipelines themselves were not affected.
Klaba wrote on X that anyone caught should change every secret stored on the disk, and that the binary's purpose was to retrieve secrets from it. He also said: "The quality of the binary is poor but it can go all the way."
Who ran a swapped build
The malicious files reached people who, between the two timestamps, ran the official install script, downloaded an archive from the release page of one of the five versions, ran a CI job that fetched the archive without a pinned hash, or used the CLI's own upgrade command from a v0.12.0 to v0.14.0 install on macOS or Linux where the tool had been installed by script or by hand.
Homebrew users were protected because the cask in force during the window pinned the original SHA-256, so an upgrade would have failed rather than installed the swapped file. Builds from source and go install were unaffected, and the Docker image's latest tag had not been rebuilt since 21 September. Copies installed before the window and not updated are original.
A build can be checked without running it using go version -m. The swapped v0.15.0 carries the pseudo-version v0.15.1-0.20261013083505-5ead8ef9b43d+dirty, the commit 5ead8ef rather than 760fd72, and an -ldflags="-s -w" line. The +dirty marker and vcs lines also appear on OVHcloud's clean v0.16.0, so they do not identify malware on their own, but a genuine release shows no -ldflags line. The only published hash of a swapped file is the v0.15.0 Linux ARM64 archive, SHA-256 3833daffcaaaab27e4e0e0833240ffcb1df8df648f4ec0bc4a75c176e28933cb.
Conflicting timings and an unconfirmed link
The sources give conflicting timestamps for the exposure. The Hacker News gives a 94-minute window starting at 12:47 UTC on 19 October. BleepingComputer, quoting Klaba, says the compromised release appeared at 14:47 and was detected and blocked at 16:21 after a customer reported it—also a 94-minute window. Neither account reconciles the two-hour difference between the start times.
OpenSourceMalware, a community threat-intelligence group, says the attack was likely part of a new GlassWorm operation, a campaign tracked since late 2025 against the VSCode, OpenVSX, GitHub and npm development ecosystems, and that the account used had been compromised for more than half a year. The group says it did not analyse the payload delivered through the OVHcloud CLI. OVHcloud has not named an operator or backed the GlassWorm link.
What is not known yet
- Who was operating the hijacked GitHub account and who uploaded the malicious build.
- How many copies of the swapped archives were downloaded before they were deleted.
- What the binary reads from disk, where it sends the data, and whether any user's secrets were actually taken.
- Whether the GlassWorm connection is correct; no swapped archive has been analysed in public.
What to do
If you use the OVHcloud CLI
- Treat every secret readable from any machine that ran v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 during the exposure window as compromised, and rotate them from a different machine.
- Remove the installed binary and install v0.16.0 from its immutable release.
- Check a downloaded archive against the release with gh release verify-asset v0.16.0 FILE.
- Inspect a suspect binary without running it with go version -m and look for commit 5ead8ef and the pseudo-version.
If you publish software through GitHub releases
- Enable release immutability before publishing, since it protects only releases created after it is switched on.
- Pin hashes when CI jobs or build steps fetch release archives over the network.
- Review which accounts and contributors hold write access to repositories and release assets.
For everyone else
- Treat an archive fetched without a pinned hash as unverified, even when it comes from a vendor's official release page.
Update log
- First published.
Sources
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