The short version
- The breach. Rackspace told customers that an unauthorised party used leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot between about 00:20 and 22:00 UTC on 17 November 2026. The company says it learned of the intrusion on 18 November after a customer report and confirmed that customer was affected the same day.
- What attackers could reach. Acting as legitimate users in some customer organisations, the attackers could create pods, list nodes and volumes, and read Kubernetes Secrets, which hold passwords, tokens and API keys. Rackspace warned they could also read Spot API tokens and refresh tokens held by affected users.
- The response. Rackspace says it revoked affected tokens and sessions, removed unauthorised pods, rotated keys and strengthened access controls and monitoring. Customers were told to reissue Spot API tokens, replace refresh tokens in automation tools, download fresh Kubernetes configuration files and rotate credentials stored in cluster Secrets.
- The outage. The Spot administration console was unavailable for an extended period, which stopped customers managing clusters or rotating possibly compromised credentials. Rackspace said service was fully restored on 21 November.
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 17 Nov | Attackers use leaked credentials to access parts of Rackspace Spot, roughly between 00:20 and 22:00 UTC. |
| 18 Nov | Rackspace learns of the intrusion from a customer report and confirms that customer's organisation was affected. |
| 21 Nov | Rackspace says Spot service is fully restored after the administration console outage; BleepingComputer reports the customer notification. |
How the attackers got in
Rackspace set out the intrusion in a notification to affected customers, which BleepingComputer obtained. According to that notice, an unauthorised party used leaked credentials to reach parts of Rackspace Spot on 17 November 2026. Rackspace says it learned of the activity on 18 November after a customer reported it. Spot is a platform for deploying and managing containerised applications on Kubernetes.
The notice does not say where the credentials came from or whether they belonged to Rackspace staff, a customer or a third party. It describes the attackers as acting as legitimate users inside some customer organisations.
What was exposed in customer clusters
With that access, Rackspace says, the attackers could create pods, read Kubernetes Secrets, and list nodes and volumes. Secrets hold passwords, authentication tokens and API keys for databases, cloud services and other systems. Rackspace warned that the attackers could have read any Secret stored in an affected user's clusters, as well as Spot API tokens and refresh tokens held by affected users.
Beyond rotating credentials, Rackspace advised customers to review logs for databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage and third-party services back to 17 November to look for misuse of exposed credentials. It published indicators of compromise: IP address 23.224.79.106, the range 23.224.0.0/15, and the pod and object prefixes i1, glm- and probe.
The outage and the open questions
The breach also took down the Spot administration console for an extended period, leaving customers unable to manage clusters or rotate credentials while the company worked. In a Reddit discussion, Sirish Raghuram, co-founder and chief growth officer of Platform9, which co-developed Spot with Rackspace, said access was cut deliberately while the environment was secured. "I know you disagree, but we made the decision that shutting all access down and sanitizing the entire environment is what we can do to best protect everyone using Spot."
BleepingComputer said it asked Rackspace how many customers were affected and whether customer data was stolen, and had not received a response. The notification itself gives no figure for affected organisations and does not say whether the attackers used the access to reach systems beyond the clusters.
What is not known yet
- Who obtained and used the leaked credentials, and whether they came from Rackspace, a customer or a third party.
- How many customer organisations were affected.
- Whether any data was taken from customer clusters or from systems reached with the exposed secrets and tokens.
- Whether the attackers used their access before Rackspace removed the unauthorised pods.
What to do
If you use Rackspace Spot
- Reissue your Spot API tokens and replace refresh tokens used in automation tools.
- Download fresh Kubernetes configuration files for your clusters.
- Rotate every credential stored in your cluster Secrets.
If your clusters may have been affected
- Review logs for databases, container registries, Git repositories, cloud storage and third-party services back to 17 November for misuse of exposed credentials.
- Search for the pod and object prefixes i1, glm- and probe, and for traffic to or from 23.224.79.106 and 23.224.0.0/15.
For everyone else
- Treat tokens and secrets issued by a managed platform as shared with that platform, and rotate them after any vendor-side credential incident.
- Keep a record of what each token and cluster secret can reach so you can judge quickly what to rotate.
Update log
- First published.
Sources
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