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Siemens Software Centre flaw exploited in ClickFix malware attacks

Siemens has confirmed that attackers exploited a DLL side-loading flaw in its Software Centre to run malware, and has linked the activity to a ClickFix platform called Romulus. The flaw is fixed in version 4.0.9.8, which installed copies receive the next time they launch.

· First published

The short version

  • The flaw. Siemens Software Centre, the tool customers use to download, install, activate and update bought software, loaded helper libraries from folders it did not properly restrict. The flaw is CVE-2026-110936, scored 8.4 under CVSS v4, disclosed on 15 October and fixed in version 4.0.9.8.
  • The exploitation. On 19 October Siemens added a link to a blog post describing in-the-wild attacks to its advisory. Attackers paired a genuine, digitally signed copy of the program with their own malicious library placed in the same folder.
  • The campaign. Siemens attributes the attacks to Romulus, a ClickFix delivery platform that uses fake prompts, such as bogus CAPTCHA checks, to get victims to run commands themselves. The chain ends in a remote access trojan.
  • The scope. Neither the Forescout research on Romulus nor Huntress's late-September report on a related campaign names Siemens Software Centre. The overlap is shared infrastructure and a similar side-loading technique.
  • What to do. Update to version 4.0.9.8 or later, launch the application so the update applies, block the listed hosts and hunt for the program starting from an unusual folder.

Timeline

DateEvent
Late SeptemberHuntress reports a ClickFix campaign that used rogue ChatGPT Custom GPTs and signed Stardock and Canon programs for DLL side-loading, and says it responded to at least 40 incidents.
15 OctoberSiemens discloses CVE-2026-110936 with a CVSS v4 score of 8.4.
17 OctoberSiemens updates the advisory to say version 4.0.9.8 resolves the issue.
19 OctoberSiemens tells customers the flaw has been exploited, linking to a blog post with indicators of compromise.

The flaw and the fix

Siemens disclosed CVE-2026-110936 on 15 October with a CVSS v4 score of 8.4. The program loaded dynamic-link libraries (DLLs, the Windows code modules an application pulls in at run time) from locations it did not properly restrict, so an authenticated local attacker able to write to one of those folders could get code run with the application's privileges. Two days later Siemens updated the advisory to say version 4.0.9.8 fixes it, and installed copies receive the fix when they next launch.

Huntress researcher Jose Oregon is credited with reporting the flaw. On 19 October Siemens added a link to a blog post describing the attacks and said it is sharing threat intelligence with authorities and endpoint detection and response (EDR) providers. The post lists indicators of compromise and signs that a machine may be infected. Because the abused executable is genuine and signed, Siemens advises defenders to focus on behaviour and the folders involved rather than on file hashes.

How the attacks worked

Attackers took a legitimate, digitally signed copy of Siemens Software Centre and put their own malicious library, archive.dll, beside it. The program loaded that helper file from its own folder without checking it, so the attacker's code ran at the program's privileges. According to Siemens, the release current at the time did not validate these files before loading them. The chain used msiexec.exe to run an installer named AllMyBasic.msi, which then started SiemensSoftwareCenter.exe.

Siemens attributes the activity to Romulus, a multi-platform ClickFix operation. ClickFix lures are fake prompts, such as bogus CAPTCHA checks, that tell a visitor to paste and execute a command on their own device. Siemens lists 96.62.218[.]59 as payload hosting and command-and-control, wizardexpensive[.]com as further hosting and control, and 2.27.248[.]127 as the distribution channel for AllMyBasic.msi. The payload ultimately deploys a remote access trojan, software that gives an intruder continuing control of the machine.

A wider toolkit, a partial link

Forescout published research on Romulus shortly before Siemens' statement. It found the platform serving several payloads, including LegionLoader and a trojanised installer that abused a legitimate Stardock application for DLL side-loading, and running on several servers, among them the one Siemens identified as the distribution server for its malicious bundle. Forescout could not determine who runs Romulus; it said it could be a private tool, a service sold to cybercriminals, an affiliate programme, or software copied by different actors.

Huntress described the same Stardock-based package in a late-September report on a campaign that used rogue ChatGPT Custom GPTs to send users to ClickFix pages, and said it believes signed programs from other vendors are probably being misused as well. Neither report names Siemens Software Centre. The overlap is infrastructure and technique, which suggests the program may have been added to the same toolkit but does not establish a single operator. Siemens said: "No Siemens system, product or update channel was breached to our knowledge."

What is not known yet

  • Who operates Romulus, and whether it is one group, a paid service or several actors using the same tooling.
  • How many organisations or individuals received the malicious bundle and were infected.
  • Whether the remote access trojan led to data theft, credential capture or lateral movement in any victim network.
  • Whether the Siemens Software Centre bundle was used in any of the 40 incidents Huntress says it handled.
  • Which other signed applications have been, or are being, abused in the same way.

What to do

If you use Siemens Software Centre

  1. Update to version 4.0.9.8 or later and launch the application so the update is applied.
  2. Search endpoint logs for SiemensSoftwareCenter.exe running from AppData\Local\Programs and started by msiexec.exe, and treat any match as suspicious.
  3. Block the hosts listed in Siemens' advisory and in its blog post while you investigate.

If you run detection or incident response

  1. Do not rely on hashes of the Siemens executable, since the abused file is genuine; build detections on the loading folder and the parent process.
  2. Check endpoints for the infection signs listed in Siemens' blog post and use its indicators of compromise to scope the incident.
  3. Review Forescout's Romulus research and Huntress's report for related payloads and infrastructure that may appear in your telemetry.

For everyone else

  1. Treat prompts on a website that ask you to paste and run a command, including fake CAPTCHA checks, as hostile and close the page.
  2. Tell staff that no legitimate service needs a command pasted into the Windows Run dialog or a terminal to prove they are human.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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