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Critical Xen Orchestra authentication bypass exploited to hijack virtualisation hosts

Vates says a critical authentication bypass in Xen Orchestra, tracked as VSA-2026-062, is being exploited in the wild and can give attackers administrator rights over XCP-ng virtualisation hosts. Fixed releases exist, but the sources give different version numbers and a second flaw has no fix yet.

· First published

The short version

  • The flaw. Xen Orchestra, Vates' web-based management platform for XCP-ng and XenServer environments, has a critical authentication bypass tracked as VSA-2026-062. No CVE identifier or CVSS score has been assigned. Researchers at TDC NET Security found it.
  • The exploitation. Vates says the flaw is being actively exploited and has published attacker infrastructure and indicators tied to one campaign. The Hacker News notes that one of the listed IP addresses has been flagged on VirusTotal as a RedLine Stealer command-and-control server.
  • The impact. A crafted cookie logs an attacker in as the owner of an existing token with administrator privileges, and reusable login token IDs can then be retrieved. Vates says this can lead to code execution on managed pools and root-level takeover of XCP-ng nodes.
  • The fixes. Patched Xen Orchestra releases are available, but the sources disagree on version numbers, so administrators should check Vates' advisory. SecurityWeek reports a second flaw, exploited by the same actor, for which a fix is still in development.
  • Detection. Vates says exploitation leaves no identifying entries in logs and must be caught through HTTP monitoring. The published indicators apply only to this campaign, and their absence does not prove an environment is clean.

Timeline

DateEvent
10 NovSecurity press reports Vates' advisory on the authentication bypass and Vates' confirmation that the flaw is being actively exploited.
11 NovSecurityWeek reports that Vates has disclosed a second flaw exploited by the same actor, with a fix still in development.

How the bypass works

Xen Orchestra is a web-based management console from French software company Vates, used to administer XCP-ng and XenServer virtualisation hosts, storage and pools. Vates tracks the defect as VSA-2026-062; no CVE identifier or CVSS score has been assigned. Filip Magic and Christoffer Olsen of TDC NET Security discovered and reported it, according to BleepingComputer and The Hacker News.

The weakness sits in REST authentication. A crafted cookie, authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D, is turned into an empty JSON object. Token collection treats that object as an unfiltered lookup and returns its first token, and the provider authenticates the caller as that token's owner if it has not expired. The /rest/v0/users/me/authentication_tokens route then hands back reusable login token IDs.

No credentials are needed. Vates says the bypass yields administrator privileges, and that "Xen Orchestra compromise can lead to arbitrary code execution on managed pools and a full XCP-ng node takeover as root."

The attacks and the indicators

Vates confirmed active exploitation and published indicators of compromise: connections to 91.211.251.112:8001 and to a Tor address, HTTP requests carrying the crafted cookie, a virtual machine (VM) named pivot2, VMs configured with the hvm_serial: file parameter, and files under /etc/cron.d and the filesystem root. It says these indicators belong to one known campaign and may not cover other actors.

The Hacker News reports that the IP address has been flagged on VirusTotal as a RedLine Stealer command-and-control server; no source names the actor behind the intrusions. The Hacker News also says it is unclear when the activity began and whether the flaw was used as a zero-day before a patch existed.

SecurityWeek reports a second flaw that Vates disclosed and that the same actor exploited once it held administrator rights. It allows malicious VM imports that could compromise XCP-ng hosts, and a fix is still being developed at the time of that report.

Patching, versions and detection

The sources give different fixed versions. BleepingComputer reports Xen Orchestra 6.9.1 on the stable channel and 6.10.0 on the latest, with patched xo-server packages. SecurityWeek describes releases before 6.9.2 and 6.10.1 as affected. Administrators should follow Vates' advisory rather than either article for the exact build.

Exploitation does not produce identifying log entries such as the crafted cookie, according to Vates, so detection depends on monitoring HTTP traffic. Vates also warns that the absence of its indicators is not enough to conclude that no compromise occurred, and says a confirmed compromise warrants a full reinstallation because cleanup alone cannot guarantee removal of every backdoor.

What is not known yet

  • Who is behind the intrusions, and whether the actor is a single group or several.
  • How many organisations or hosts were compromised before the advisory.
  • Whether data was taken from affected environments, and what kind.
  • When the exploitation began, and whether the flaw was used before a patch was available.
  • When a fix for the second flaw, the malicious VM import issue, will be released.

What to do

If you run Xen Orchestra

  1. Apply the fixed release named in Vates' advisory, or the patched xo-server packages it lists.
  2. If you cannot patch immediately, remove Xen Orchestra from internet access and place it on a dedicated management network.
  3. Block the empty token in a web application firewall (WAF) or reverse proxy, and block the IP address and Tor address Vates published.

If you suspect a compromise

  1. Check XCP-ng hosts for a VM named pivot2, for VMs configured with hvm_serial: file, and for the cron and hidden files Vates listed.
  2. Monitor HTTP traffic for requests carrying authenticationToken=j:%7B%7D or authenticationToken=j:{} rather than relying on logs.
  3. Rotate all passwords and secrets used by the virtualisation environment.
  4. Rebuild affected installations rather than cleaning them, as Vates advises.

For everyone else

  1. Keep management consoles for virtualisation and infrastructure off the public internet and reachable only from administrative networks.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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