Government cybersecurity begins with the estate no department listed.
A government’s public estate is published by hundreds of departments, agencies and contractors under one official name. ShadowMap rebuilds it from outside: every site and service answering under the official domain, the management interfaces left reachable from the internet, the portals imitating a citizen service, and official email addresses appearing in stealer logs. No agent, no seed list and no connection to an internal network.
“Every department runs its own sites under the official domain. Which of them are still ours, and which only look like ours?”
Discovery starts from the official domain, with no departmental inventory and nothing installed. Confirmed impersonations go for removal through 86 provider relationships across 12 provider types. Security Brigade has been CERT-In empanelled since 2008.
What a citizen can reach
Six places a public body is exposed, and none of them is inside the network
A citizen, and an attacker, meet a government through what it publishes. Each row is one part of that, with the capability that covers it.
| Where | What is exposed there | Covered by |
|---|---|---|
| Sites under the official domain | Scheme microsites, pilot portals, event pages and the subdomains of bodies that have since merged or closed, many still serving on the software they launched with. | Attack Surface Management |
| The external estate is rebuilt every 24 hours from the domain outward, so a site that appears this week is on the record this week. | ||
| Management interfaces | Administrative logins for routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators and load balancers, reachable from the public internet when they were meant for an internal network. | Attack Surface Management |
| Discovery records that the interface answers and since when. Whether it can be used is tested by Continuous Automated Red-Teaming only where it is safe and authorised, and the finding says which of the two happened. | ||
| Portals imitating a citizen service | Look-alike domains for tax refunds, benefit claims, visa applications and fine payments, registered to collect credentials and card details in the government’s name. | Domain Monitoring |
| Registration, DNS and certificate changes are watched, so a look-alike is caught before it is weaponised. | ||
| Apps and accounts in an agency’s name | Mobile applications republished into third-party stores under an official name and logo, and social profiles answering citizens as if they were the agency. | Brand Protection |
| Matched on logos, imagery and site copy as well as on the name, so a copy on an unrelated domain string is still found. | ||
| Official email addresses | Staff logins to official mail and remote-access systems captured by infostealers on home and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them. | Dark Web Monitoring |
| Each credential is reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested. | ||
| Contractors and system integrators | Source code for a public service pushed to a public repository under a contractor’s own account, with the keys and connection strings it was built with. | Data Exposure Monitoring |
| Public sources only. Nothing is connected to a repository or a build system. | ||
Sites under the official domain
- What is exposed there
- Scheme microsites, pilot portals, event pages and the subdomains of bodies that have since merged or closed, many still serving on the software they launched with.
- Covered by
- Attack Surface Management
The external estate is rebuilt every 24 hours from the domain outward, so a site that appears this week is on the record this week.
Management interfaces
- What is exposed there
- Administrative logins for routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators and load balancers, reachable from the public internet when they were meant for an internal network.
- Covered by
- Attack Surface Management
Discovery records that the interface answers and since when. Whether it can be used is tested by Continuous Automated Red-Teaming only where it is safe and authorised, and the finding says which of the two happened.
Portals imitating a citizen service
- What is exposed there
- Look-alike domains for tax refunds, benefit claims, visa applications and fine payments, registered to collect credentials and card details in the government’s name.
- Covered by
- Domain Monitoring
Registration, DNS and certificate changes are watched, so a look-alike is caught before it is weaponised.
Apps and accounts in an agency’s name
- What is exposed there
- Mobile applications republished into third-party stores under an official name and logo, and social profiles answering citizens as if they were the agency.
- Covered by
- Brand Protection
Matched on logos, imagery and site copy as well as on the name, so a copy on an unrelated domain string is still found.
Official email addresses
- What is exposed there
- Staff logins to official mail and remote-access systems captured by infostealers on home and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them.
- Covered by
- Dark Web Monitoring
Each credential is reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.
Contractors and system integrators
- What is exposed there
- Source code for a public service pushed to a public repository under a contractor’s own account, with the keys and connection strings it was built with.
- Covered by
- Data Exposure Monitoring
Public sources only. Nothing is connected to a repository or a build system.
Attribution
Under one official name, the first question is whose it is
A finding nobody owns does not get fixed. Everything that answers under an official name, or imitates one, falls into one of four classes before anyone is asked to act.
| State | What it means | What follows |
|---|---|---|
| Yours, and on the register | A site or service the owning department already records, answering where the record says it should. | Monitored continuously. Changes to what it serves are dated. |
| Yours, and on no register | A scheme microsite, a pilot or a closed body’s subdomain that resolves to government infrastructure and appears in nobody’s inventory. | Attributed to the department whose registration, certificate or address range it resolves to, and added to the record with a named owner. |
| A contractor’s, serving in your name | A public service hosted on an integrator’s infrastructure under the official domain or logo, under the contractor’s control. | Surfaced with the contractor named and the date attached, and routed to them to confirm and fix. Nothing is probed without authorisation over that estate. |
| Not yours at all | A look-alike domain, cloned portal, app or profile using the official name with no connection to the body it imitates. | An evidence pack is assembled, and the removal is filed with the registrar, host or platform once you authorise it. |
- Recorded and monitored
- Live, and newly attributed
- Routed to the contractor
- Filed for removal
What the sector answers to
Five texts that put a date on external exposure
Each binds a different set of bodies, named in its row. The right-hand column is the dated record ShadowMap holds beneath it.
| Text | What it says | What the monitoring record shows |
|---|---|---|
| CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-01, United States | Federal civilian executive branch agencies must “perform automated asset discovery every 7 days” and “initiate vulnerability enumeration across all discovered assets”, roaming devices included, “every 14 days”. | The internet-facing part of that scope, rediscovered every 24 hours and dated. |
| Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-01, issued 3 October 2022, read 18 November 2026. The directive covers an agency’s whole network; ShadowMap’s record is the part that answers from the internet. | ||
| CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-02, United States | Within 14 days of notification by CISA or discovery by an agency of a networked management interface in scope, the agency must remove it from the internet or enforce access control through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface. The device classes in scope include routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies and load balancers. | Which management interfaces answer from the internet, the date each was first seen and the date it stopped answering. |
| Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, read 18 November 2026. | ||
| CERT-In Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities, India | Government entities are to maintain an inventory of authorised hardware and software, hold an internal information security audit at least once in six months and a third-party security audit at least once a year. CERT-In empanelled auditors may be used for the external audit. | The external inventory between two audits, with every change dated. |
| Source: cert-in.org.in, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.6 of the Guidelines, read 18 November 2026. Security Brigade has been a CERT-In empanelled auditor since 2008; an audit is a separate engagement from a ShadowMap licence. | ||
| NIS2 Directive, European Union | Annex I lists public administration as a sector of high criticality: public administration entities of central governments, and those at regional level, as each Member State defines them. | Supplier and estate records for the risk-management measures Article 21 sets out. |
| Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given body is a determination for that body and its advisers. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion. | ||
| NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-2:2024), Saudi Arabia | Applicable to government agencies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their affiliated companies and entities. Control 2-11-3 sets the scope of penetration testing “to include all externally provided services (via the Internet) and their technical components, including infrastructure, websites, web applications, smartphone and tablet applications, email, and remote access”. | The current list of externally provided services, rebuilt every 24 hours and dated. |
| Source: National Cybersecurity Authority, ECC-2:2024, read 18 November 2026. The control-by-control guide is linked from the name of the text. | ||
CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-01, United States
- What it says
- Federal civilian executive branch agencies must “perform automated asset discovery every 7 days” and “initiate vulnerability enumeration across all discovered assets”, roaming devices included, “every 14 days”.
- What the monitoring record shows
- The internet-facing part of that scope, rediscovered every 24 hours and dated.
Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-01, issued 3 October 2022, read 18 November 2026. The directive covers an agency’s whole network; ShadowMap’s record is the part that answers from the internet.
CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-02, United States
- What it says
- Within 14 days of notification by CISA or discovery by an agency of a networked management interface in scope, the agency must remove it from the internet or enforce access control through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface. The device classes in scope include routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies and load balancers.
- What the monitoring record shows
- Which management interfaces answer from the internet, the date each was first seen and the date it stopped answering.
Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, read 18 November 2026.
CERT-In Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities, India
- What it says
- Government entities are to maintain an inventory of authorised hardware and software, hold an internal information security audit at least once in six months and a third-party security audit at least once a year. CERT-In empanelled auditors may be used for the external audit.
- What the monitoring record shows
- The external inventory between two audits, with every change dated.
Source: cert-in.org.in, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.6 of the Guidelines, read 18 November 2026. Security Brigade has been a CERT-In empanelled auditor since 2008; an audit is a separate engagement from a ShadowMap licence.
NIS2 Directive, European Union
- What it says
- Annex I lists public administration as a sector of high criticality: public administration entities of central governments, and those at regional level, as each Member State defines them.
- What the monitoring record shows
- Supplier and estate records for the risk-management measures Article 21 sets out.
Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given body is a determination for that body and its advisers. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion.
NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-2:2024), Saudi Arabia
- What it says
- Applicable to government agencies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their affiliated companies and entities. Control 2-11-3 sets the scope of penetration testing “to include all externally provided services (via the Internet) and their technical components, including infrastructure, websites, web applications, smartphone and tablet applications, email, and remote access”.
- What the monitoring record shows
- The current list of externally provided services, rebuilt every 24 hours and dated.
Source: National Cybersecurity Authority, ECC-2:2024, read 18 November 2026. The control-by-control guide is linked from the name of the text.
Order of work
Domains first, departments second, findings third
Each step is bounded by the one before it. Taken out of order, the work produces findings with no owner.
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Domains
Start from the official domain register
The one list a government reliably holds is the list of domains issued under its official name. Each one is an apex to work outward from. No department is asked for an inventory.
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Discovery
Rebuild what answers beneath each one
Subdomains, the services and versions answering on them, certificates, cloud storage and mobile applications, with the origin infrastructure sitting behind an edge.
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Attribution
Name the owning department before anyone is asked to fix anything
Every asset is placed in one of the four classes above. A finding lands on a named body, or on a named contractor, and the unattributed ones are listed as unattributed.
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Validation
Test where it is safe and authorised
Continuous Automated Red-Teaming establishes whether an exposure can be used: whether a key is live, whether a leaked credential still authenticates. It is enabled gradually during onboarding and bounded to inventory already attributed to you.
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Impersonation
Watch the official name, and remove what borrows it
Look-alike registrations, cloned portals and fake applications are confirmed against your real sites and marks. Takedowns are unlimited, subject to fair use, and each one is filed on your authorisation.
Capabilities that apply
ShadowMap capabilities for government and public sector
Attack Surface Management
Continuous outside-in discovery of the internet-facing estate, including the origin infrastructure sitting behind your edge.
Dark Web Monitoring
A proprietary stealer-log collection with permanent raw-source retention, so improved extraction improves your history as well as your present.
Brand Protection
Impersonation detection across domains, social platforms, app stores and executive identity, ending in removal, not an alert.
Domain Monitoring
Look-alike, typosquatted and permutation domains detected at registration, scored for intent, and routed for removal.
Phishing and Domain Takedown
Orchestrated removal across registrars, hosts, platforms and app stores, with every lifecycle state published, including the ones that fail.
The jobs behind them
What those capabilities are bought to do
- Responding to an exposed secret “A key is sitting in a public repository. Is it live, what does it reach, and whose is it?”
- Seeing every subsidiary from one place “Twelve operating companies, each with their own IT. I cannot answer what we own, let alone what is exposed.”
- Responding to leaked credentials “A credential of ours is in a stealer log. Which ones still open something, and what do we rotate first?”
- Assessing a target before you sign “We are acquiring. Tell me what we are inheriting, from outside, without touching their network.”
- Seeing your payout API exposure from outside “CERT-In says attackers reached payout APIs through test systems and leaked keys. What of ours can they see from outside?”
- Finding the estate nobody registered “Marketing stood up a subdomain three years ago and pointed it at a service that no longer exists.”
Questions buyers ask
Before you evaluate this
Does ShadowMap need access to a government network?
ShadowMap works from outside the perimeter. Discovery starts from an official domain and reads public registration, certificate and address-range records and what answers from the internet. Nothing is installed, no credentials are handed over and no internal system is connected.
A fake portal is collecting payments in our name. What happens next?
The page is matched against your real site, logos and copy, and an evidence pack is assembled against whoever controls it. You raise the removal request and attest that you are authorised to act. The registrar, host or platform that can remove it is then resolved and the notice is filed, through 86 provider relationships across 12 provider types. Every case state is published, including the ones that close without a removal.
Thousands of official email addresses turn up in breach data. Which ones matter?
The ones that still open something. Credentials from stealer logs are grouped by the infected machine and matched to the login surface they were captured against. Where it is safe and authorised they are tested against your own login pages, and each is reported as Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.
Can ShadowMap tell us whether we meet a directive or guideline?
ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record: what was exposed, when it was first seen, who it was attributed to and when it closed. Whether a text binds a given body, and whether its obligations are met, is a determination for that body and its advisers.
Start with one official domain
Thirty minutes on a domain you choose: what answers beneath it, which department each asset resolves to, and what is imitating it.