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Industry · Ministries, agencies and public bodies

Government cybersecurity begins with the estate no department listed.

A government’s public estate is published by hundreds of departments, agencies and contractors under one official name. ShadowMap rebuilds it from outside: every site and service answering under the official domain, the management interfaces left reachable from the internet, the portals imitating a citizen service, and official email addresses appearing in stealer logs. No agent, no seed list and no connection to an internal network.

“Every department runs its own sites under the official domain. Which of them are still ours, and which only look like ours?”

Discovery starts from the official domain, with no departmental inventory and nothing installed. Confirmed impersonations go for removal through 86 provider relationships across 12 provider types. Security Brigade has been CERT-In empanelled since 2008.

What a citizen can reach

Six places a public body is exposed, and none of them is inside the network

A citizen, and an attacker, meet a government through what it publishes. Each row is one part of that, with the capability that covers it.

WhereWhat is exposed thereCovered by
Sites under the official domain Scheme microsites, pilot portals, event pages and the subdomains of bodies that have since merged or closed, many still serving on the software they launched with. Attack Surface Management
The external estate is rebuilt every 24 hours from the domain outward, so a site that appears this week is on the record this week.
Management interfaces Administrative logins for routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators and load balancers, reachable from the public internet when they were meant for an internal network. Attack Surface Management
Discovery records that the interface answers and since when. Whether it can be used is tested by Continuous Automated Red-Teaming only where it is safe and authorised, and the finding says which of the two happened.
Portals imitating a citizen service Look-alike domains for tax refunds, benefit claims, visa applications and fine payments, registered to collect credentials and card details in the government’s name. Domain Monitoring
Registration, DNS and certificate changes are watched, so a look-alike is caught before it is weaponised.
Apps and accounts in an agency’s name Mobile applications republished into third-party stores under an official name and logo, and social profiles answering citizens as if they were the agency. Brand Protection
Matched on logos, imagery and site copy as well as on the name, so a copy on an unrelated domain string is still found.
Official email addresses Staff logins to official mail and remote-access systems captured by infostealers on home and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them. Dark Web Monitoring
Each credential is reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.
Contractors and system integrators Source code for a public service pushed to a public repository under a contractor’s own account, with the keys and connection strings it was built with. Data Exposure Monitoring
Public sources only. Nothing is connected to a repository or a build system.

Sites under the official domain

What is exposed there
Scheme microsites, pilot portals, event pages and the subdomains of bodies that have since merged or closed, many still serving on the software they launched with.

The external estate is rebuilt every 24 hours from the domain outward, so a site that appears this week is on the record this week.

Management interfaces

What is exposed there
Administrative logins for routers, firewalls, VPN concentrators and load balancers, reachable from the public internet when they were meant for an internal network.

Discovery records that the interface answers and since when. Whether it can be used is tested by Continuous Automated Red-Teaming only where it is safe and authorised, and the finding says which of the two happened.

Portals imitating a citizen service

What is exposed there
Look-alike domains for tax refunds, benefit claims, visa applications and fine payments, registered to collect credentials and card details in the government’s name.
Covered by
Domain Monitoring

Registration, DNS and certificate changes are watched, so a look-alike is caught before it is weaponised.

Apps and accounts in an agency’s name

What is exposed there
Mobile applications republished into third-party stores under an official name and logo, and social profiles answering citizens as if they were the agency.
Covered by
Brand Protection

Matched on logos, imagery and site copy as well as on the name, so a copy on an unrelated domain string is still found.

Official email addresses

What is exposed there
Staff logins to official mail and remote-access systems captured by infostealers on home and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them.

Each credential is reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.

Contractors and system integrators

What is exposed there
Source code for a public service pushed to a public repository under a contractor’s own account, with the keys and connection strings it was built with.

Public sources only. Nothing is connected to a repository or a build system.

Attribution

Under one official name, the first question is whose it is

A finding nobody owns does not get fixed. Everything that answers under an official name, or imitates one, falls into one of four classes before anyone is asked to act.

Under one official name, the first question is whose it is
StateWhat it meansWhat follows
Yours, and on the register A site or service the owning department already records, answering where the record says it should. Monitored continuously. Changes to what it serves are dated.
Yours, and on no register A scheme microsite, a pilot or a closed body’s subdomain that resolves to government infrastructure and appears in nobody’s inventory. Attributed to the department whose registration, certificate or address range it resolves to, and added to the record with a named owner.
A contractor’s, serving in your name A public service hosted on an integrator’s infrastructure under the official domain or logo, under the contractor’s control. Surfaced with the contractor named and the date attached, and routed to them to confirm and fix. Nothing is probed without authorisation over that estate.
Not yours at all A look-alike domain, cloned portal, app or profile using the official name with no connection to the body it imitates. An evidence pack is assembled, and the removal is filed with the registrar, host or platform once you authorise it.
Key
  • Recorded and monitored
  • Live, and newly attributed
  • Routed to the contractor
  • Filed for removal

What the sector answers to

Five texts that put a date on external exposure

Each binds a different set of bodies, named in its row. The right-hand column is the dated record ShadowMap holds beneath it.

TextWhat it saysWhat the monitoring record shows
CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-01, United States Federal civilian executive branch agencies must “perform automated asset discovery every 7 days” and “initiate vulnerability enumeration across all discovered assets”, roaming devices included, “every 14 days”. The internet-facing part of that scope, rediscovered every 24 hours and dated.
Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-01, issued 3 October 2022, read 18 November 2026. The directive covers an agency’s whole network; ShadowMap’s record is the part that answers from the internet.
CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-02, United States Within 14 days of notification by CISA or discovery by an agency of a networked management interface in scope, the agency must remove it from the internet or enforce access control through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface. The device classes in scope include routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies and load balancers. Which management interfaces answer from the internet, the date each was first seen and the date it stopped answering.
Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, read 18 November 2026.
CERT-In Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities, India Government entities are to maintain an inventory of authorised hardware and software, hold an internal information security audit at least once in six months and a third-party security audit at least once a year. CERT-In empanelled auditors may be used for the external audit. The external inventory between two audits, with every change dated.
Source: cert-in.org.in, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.6 of the Guidelines, read 18 November 2026. Security Brigade has been a CERT-In empanelled auditor since 2008; an audit is a separate engagement from a ShadowMap licence.
NIS2 Directive, European Union Annex I lists public administration as a sector of high criticality: public administration entities of central governments, and those at regional level, as each Member State defines them. Supplier and estate records for the risk-management measures Article 21 sets out.
Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given body is a determination for that body and its advisers. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion.
NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-2:2024), Saudi Arabia Applicable to government agencies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their affiliated companies and entities. Control 2-11-3 sets the scope of penetration testing “to include all externally provided services (via the Internet) and their technical components, including infrastructure, websites, web applications, smartphone and tablet applications, email, and remote access”. The current list of externally provided services, rebuilt every 24 hours and dated.
Source: National Cybersecurity Authority, ECC-2:2024, read 18 November 2026. The control-by-control guide is linked from the name of the text.

CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-01, United States

What it says
Federal civilian executive branch agencies must “perform automated asset discovery every 7 days” and “initiate vulnerability enumeration across all discovered assets”, roaming devices included, “every 14 days”.
What the monitoring record shows
The internet-facing part of that scope, rediscovered every 24 hours and dated.

Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-01, issued 3 October 2022, read 18 November 2026. The directive covers an agency’s whole network; ShadowMap’s record is the part that answers from the internet.

CISA Binding Operational Directive 23-02, United States

What it says
Within 14 days of notification by CISA or discovery by an agency of a networked management interface in scope, the agency must remove it from the internet or enforce access control through a policy enforcement point separate from the interface. The device classes in scope include routers, switches, firewalls, VPN concentrators, proxies and load balancers.
What the monitoring record shows
Which management interfaces answer from the internet, the date each was first seen and the date it stopped answering.

Source: cisa.gov, BOD 23-02, issued 13 June 2023, read 18 November 2026.

CERT-In Guidelines on Information Security Practices for Government Entities, India

What it says
Government entities are to maintain an inventory of authorised hardware and software, hold an internal information security audit at least once in six months and a third-party security audit at least once a year. CERT-In empanelled auditors may be used for the external audit.
What the monitoring record shows
The external inventory between two audits, with every change dated.

Source: cert-in.org.in, paragraphs 3.4 and 3.6 of the Guidelines, read 18 November 2026. Security Brigade has been a CERT-In empanelled auditor since 2008; an audit is a separate engagement from a ShadowMap licence.

NIS2 Directive, European Union

What it says
Annex I lists public administration as a sector of high criticality: public administration entities of central governments, and those at regional level, as each Member State defines them.
What the monitoring record shows
Supplier and estate records for the risk-management measures Article 21 sets out.

Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given body is a determination for that body and its advisers. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion.

NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls (ECC-2:2024), Saudi Arabia

What it says
Applicable to government agencies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and their affiliated companies and entities. Control 2-11-3 sets the scope of penetration testing “to include all externally provided services (via the Internet) and their technical components, including infrastructure, websites, web applications, smartphone and tablet applications, email, and remote access”.
What the monitoring record shows
The current list of externally provided services, rebuilt every 24 hours and dated.

Source: National Cybersecurity Authority, ECC-2:2024, read 18 November 2026. The control-by-control guide is linked from the name of the text.

Order of work

Domains first, departments second, findings third

Each step is bounded by the one before it. Taken out of order, the work produces findings with no owner.

Questions buyers ask

Before you evaluate this

Does ShadowMap need access to a government network?

ShadowMap works from outside the perimeter. Discovery starts from an official domain and reads public registration, certificate and address-range records and what answers from the internet. Nothing is installed, no credentials are handed over and no internal system is connected.

A fake portal is collecting payments in our name. What happens next?

The page is matched against your real site, logos and copy, and an evidence pack is assembled against whoever controls it. You raise the removal request and attest that you are authorised to act. The registrar, host or platform that can remove it is then resolved and the notice is filed, through 86 provider relationships across 12 provider types. Every case state is published, including the ones that close without a removal.

Thousands of official email addresses turn up in breach data. Which ones matter?

The ones that still open something. Credentials from stealer logs are grouped by the infected machine and matched to the login surface they were captured against. Where it is safe and authorised they are tested against your own login pages, and each is reported as Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.

Can ShadowMap tell us whether we meet a directive or guideline?

ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record: what was exposed, when it was first seen, who it was attributed to and when it closed. Whether a text binds a given body, and whether its obligations are met, is a determination for that body and its advisers.

Start with one official domain

Thirty minutes on a domain you choose: what answers beneath it, which department each asset resolves to, and what is imitating it.