The fund-transfer call came from inside. Some entry points were visible outside.
“CERT-In says attackers reached payout APIs through test systems and leaked keys. What of ours can they see from outside?”
CERT-In describes several routes into compromised lenders: exposed applications and test systems, deprecated APIs and credentials left in source code. Not every entry point is externally visible, but the exposed ones leave signals attackers can discover before they gain access. ShadowMap helps you find those signals across your estate.
ShadowMap works from the internet inwards: it needs no agent and no access to your network, and it searches public GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket for your keys and tokens.
What CERT-In described
The fraud happened at the API. The compromise started somewhere else
CERT-In describes fraudulent fund-transfer calls made with valid credentials from infrastructure the lender already used for bank integrations. The fact that a request was authenticated did not establish that its underlying loan, beneficiary or amount had been approved.
What made that possible happened earlier, and most of it was reachable from the internet. CERT-In’s advisory of 9 October 2026 (CIAD-2026-0046) names exposed internet-facing applications, deprecated and unused APIs, long-lived tokens hard-coded in source code, and plaintext credentials. Its update of 4 November 2026 (CIAD-2026-0058) adds internet-exposed UAT, staging and testing environments, used as entry points and then as a route into production through shared credentials. None of these needs a foothold to find. They are the parts of your estate that face outwards, and an attacker’s first pass over a lender looks for exactly them.
From the advisory to your estate
Five exposure signals, and what ShadowMap can establish
Each row is a signal drawn from the two advisories, what ShadowMap surfaces for it, and the page where the mechanism is set out.
| Exposure signal | What ShadowMap surfaces | Where it is set out |
|---|---|---|
| Internet-exposed UAT, staging and testing environments | Staging, UAT and demo hosts that are still live, with the technology stack and the services each one exposes. Origin-server and virtual-host detection finds a pre-production host that sits behind the same edge as production and is reachable directly. | Shadow IT discovery |
| Deprecated and unused APIs, and exposed internal applications | Web and API technologies on every responding web property, and running applications that have no entry in your own records, such as a partner API or an internal admin console nobody registered. | Attack surface management |
| API tokens and credentials hard-coded in source code | Cloud keys, API tokens, database credentials and internal references found in public GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket repositories, with repository and commit context where available. | Data exposure monitoring |
| Public repositories only. Nothing is authenticated into and no private repository is read. | ||
| A found key that may still work | Where safe and authorised, ShadowMap can use a non-destructive validation check to establish whether a discovered key still authenticates and what permissions it exposes. Findings without conclusive validation are identified as such. | Continuous Automated Red-Teaming |
| Stolen staff and service credentials | Credentials from infostealer logs, each reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested. | Leaked credentials response |
Internet-exposed UAT, staging and testing environments
- What ShadowMap surfaces
- Staging, UAT and demo hosts that are still live, with the technology stack and the services each one exposes. Origin-server and virtual-host detection finds a pre-production host that sits behind the same edge as production and is reachable directly.
- Where it is set out
- Shadow IT discovery
Deprecated and unused APIs, and exposed internal applications
- What ShadowMap surfaces
- Web and API technologies on every responding web property, and running applications that have no entry in your own records, such as a partner API or an internal admin console nobody registered.
- Where it is set out
- Attack surface management
API tokens and credentials hard-coded in source code
- What ShadowMap surfaces
- Cloud keys, API tokens, database credentials and internal references found in public GitHub, GitLab and Bitbucket repositories, with repository and commit context where available.
- Where it is set out
- Data exposure monitoring
Public repositories only. Nothing is authenticated into and no private repository is read.
A found key that may still work
- What ShadowMap surfaces
- Where safe and authorised, ShadowMap can use a non-destructive validation check to establish whether a discovered key still authenticates and what permissions it exposes. Findings without conclusive validation are identified as such.
- Where it is set out
- Continuous Automated Red-Teaming
Stolen staff and service credentials
- What ShadowMap surfaces
- Credentials from infostealer logs, each reported in one of four states: Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested.
- Where it is set out
- Leaked credentials response
In order
What to do with the first scan
The order matters, because each step narrows what the next one has to look at.
-
Read the non-production hosts first
List every staging, UAT and demo host that answers from the internet. For each one, ask whether it shares a credential, a database or a network path with production. CERT-In’s November advisory treats that sharing as the route in.
-
Reconcile the applications against your API inventory
CERT-In asks for a complete API inventory and for deprecated APIs to be decommissioned. An application ShadowMap finds that your inventory does not list is either a gap in the inventory or an API that should already be gone.
-
Revoke or rotate what is in public code
Verify ownership and exposure, then revoke or rotate affected credentials, including keys whose live status could not be established. Use the repository and commit context to identify the responsible team and prevent recurrence.
-
Hand the inside to an audit
The outside-in assessment cannot establish whether a payout can bypass sanction, beneficiary or approval controls. That requires authorised testing of the transaction journey.
Where the outside view stops
Three things this page does not cover, and where they are
The payment journey itself
Transaction-stage binding, maker-checker, beneficiary validation, limits, monitoring and reconciliation are assessed in Security Brigade’s Payout API Security Audit, which ends in a signed audit report.
Threat intelligenceThe incidents as they are reported
Incident reports on breaches and exploited flaws, updated as more is disclosed.
Exposure snapshotYour own estate, today
A free exposure snapshot shows what is visible on your domains from outside before you speak to anyone.
Sources and limits
What this page rests on
Sources As of November 2026
- CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2026-0046, “Threat Actors Exploiting Payment and Disbursement APIs for Unauthorized Fund Transfers in BFSI Entities”, 9 October 2026.
- CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2026-0058, “Escalation of AI-Driven Attacks on BFSI Entities by Threat Actor "CRAFTY FALCON"”, 4 November 2026.
- The entry points in the table are the ones those two published advisories name. The ShadowMap column describes what the platform discovers from the internet.
Deliberately excluded
- Private repositories and anything behind authentication are not read.
- Systems that are not reachable from the internet are outside discovery.
- The business logic of a payout, and the controls around it, are tested by people from inside, under written authorisation.
What this job draws on
The capabilities behind it
Where this job comes up most: Banking and financial services , Government and public sector , Healthcare , Retail and e-commerce , Technology and software and Telecommunications .
Questions buyers ask
Before you evaluate this
Does ShadowMap test our payout API?
No. ShadowMap discovers what is exposed from the internet: hosts, applications, keys in public code and stolen credentials. Testing whether a payout can be made without its approvals is done from inside, in Security Brigade’s Payout API Security Audit.
We already keep an API inventory. What does this add?
An inventory lists what you registered. Discovery from outside lists what is running. The difference between the two is where deprecated APIs and forgotten test environments are found.
Which CERT-In advisories is this based on?
CIAD-2026-0046 of 9 October 2026 and CIAD-2026-0058 of 4 November 2026, both published on CERT-In’s website.
See what your payout estate shows from outside.
A free exposure snapshot covers your domains, the hosts behind them and what is sitting in public code.