Healthcare cybersecurity starts outside the hospital network.
ShadowMap rebuilds a hospital group’s external estate from outside: the patient portals, booking and teleconsultation sites and acquired-hospital domains that answer from the internet today. It assesses the vendors holding patient records with the same method, and matches staff and vendor credentials in stealer logs to the systems they open. Nothing is installed on a clinical network.
“Most of our hospitals came by acquisition, and patient records sit with vendors we assess once a year. What of ours answers from the internet today?”
External discovery starts from an apex domain, with nothing installed on a clinical network or a medical device. The standard licence includes 20 vendors. Security Brigade has been CERT-In empanelled since 2008.
The shape of the estate
A hospital group’s public estate was built by whoever could move fastest
Clinical systems get consolidated after an acquisition. The public estate around them usually does not.
A hospital that joins a group arrives with its own domains, its own patient portal and its own IT lead. Integration reaches the clinical record first, because that is where patient safety sits, and the public-facing estate keeps running under the old name. Then come the services built at speed: teleconsultation, home-collection booking, a medical-tourism landing page, a results-download portal run by a diagnostics partner. Each was stood up by the team that needed it, outside the process the asset register records. The register is then built by asking each hospital what it runs, and the vulnerability scanner is pointed at the register, so its coverage figure measures the paperwork. Outside-in discovery asks a different question. It starts from the domains and works outward through registration and certificate records to what answers today, then lays that beside the register in both directions: what is live and unrecorded, and what is recorded and no longer there.
Where the exposure sits
What leaks, what gets impersonated, and who else holds the records
Five places a health network is exposed outside its own walls. The right-hand column is the capability that covers each one.
| Where | What is exposed there | Covered by |
|---|---|---|
| Patient-facing portals | Appointment booking, results download, teleconsultation and payment pages, including the ones an acquired hospital still serves from its original domain, and the staging copies left answering beside them. | Attack Surface Management |
| Duplicate front doors onto one application are collapsed by content fingerprinting, so a per-hospital branded hostname is not counted as a separate system. | ||
| Vendors holding patient records | Laboratories, billing and claims processors, telehealth platforms and the hosting beneath them. A questionnaire describes the vendor on the day it was answered; the shared sub-provider under several vendors appears on no register at all. | Third-Party Risk Management |
| Vendors are scored with the same categories and bands as your own estate. Vendor-side findings arrive observed and untested: the authorisation to test another organisation is not yours to give. | ||
| Staff and vendor credentials | Logins for clinical, remote-access and email systems captured by infostealers on personal and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them. Vendor staff who hold accounts in your systems are part of the same population. | Dark Web Monitoring |
| Artefacts are grouped by the infected machine, so the response starts from a device and an infection date. | ||
| Remote access into sites | VPN gateways, remote-desktop services and vendor support portals opened for an equipment supplier and never closed. | Continuous Automated Red-Teaming |
| Validation runs where it is safe and authorised. Hosts you tag clinical or medical-device-adjacent can be excluded from active validation by configuration, as the published hospital-group engagement did, and every finding states whether it was tested or only observed. | ||
| The hospital’s name | Cloned booking and payment pages, look-alike domains and profiles offering appointments or jobs in the hospital’s name. | Brand Protection |
| A confirmed impersonation ends in a removal request you authorise, filed with the platform, registrar or host that can act on it. | ||
Patient-facing portals
- What is exposed there
- Appointment booking, results download, teleconsultation and payment pages, including the ones an acquired hospital still serves from its original domain, and the staging copies left answering beside them.
- Covered by
- Attack Surface Management
Duplicate front doors onto one application are collapsed by content fingerprinting, so a per-hospital branded hostname is not counted as a separate system.
Vendors holding patient records
- What is exposed there
- Laboratories, billing and claims processors, telehealth platforms and the hosting beneath them. A questionnaire describes the vendor on the day it was answered; the shared sub-provider under several vendors appears on no register at all.
- Covered by
- Third-Party Risk Management
Vendors are scored with the same categories and bands as your own estate. Vendor-side findings arrive observed and untested: the authorisation to test another organisation is not yours to give.
Staff and vendor credentials
- What is exposed there
- Logins for clinical, remote-access and email systems captured by infostealers on personal and shared machines, with the session cookies taken alongside them. Vendor staff who hold accounts in your systems are part of the same population.
- Covered by
- Dark Web Monitoring
Artefacts are grouped by the infected machine, so the response starts from a device and an infection date.
Remote access into sites
- What is exposed there
- VPN gateways, remote-desktop services and vendor support portals opened for an equipment supplier and never closed.
- Covered by
- Continuous Automated Red-Teaming
Validation runs where it is safe and authorised. Hosts you tag clinical or medical-device-adjacent can be excluded from active validation by configuration, as the published hospital-group engagement did, and every finding states whether it was tested or only observed.
The hospital’s name
- What is exposed there
- Cloned booking and payment pages, look-alike domains and profiles offering appointments or jobs in the hospital’s name.
- Covered by
- Brand Protection
A confirmed impersonation ends in a removal request you authorise, filed with the platform, registrar or host that can act on it.
Published engagements
Two hospital groups, in their published words
Both stories are anonymised and published in full. Each card title is the story’s own outcome line.
The inventory stopped being a snapshot and became a control
A multi-country hospital group reconciled its asset register against what answered from the internet: 422 live hostnames were absent from the register, and the matched share of the live estate moved from 69% to 96% in 90 days.
Private hospital networkA vendor register that is true on the day it is read
A hospital network put 64 vendors under continuous monitoring. 19 of them resolved to one sub-provider the group had never assessed, and a written remediation plan arrived in a median of six days against a 41-day questionnaire turnaround.
All sectorsEvery published ShadowMap story
Anonymised engagements across healthcare, telecommunications, travel and hospitality, logistics and gaming, each with its figures and its limits.
What the sector answers to
Three regimes, and the part of each that looks outward
Each row quotes or cites the text itself. The right-hand column is the dated record ShadowMap holds beneath it.
| Regime | What the text says | What the monitoring record shows |
|---|---|---|
| HIPAA Security Rule, United States | 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) requires a covered entity or business associate to “conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information”. Under 164.308(b)(1) a covered entity may let a business associate handle that information only on satisfactory assurances that it will be safeguarded. | The internet-facing systems that exist today, dated, and the observed external posture of each business associate between two assurance cycles. |
| Source: Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 45 CFR 164.308, read 18 November 2026. | ||
| NIS2 Directive, European Union | Annex I lists health as a sector of high criticality, healthcare providers included. Article 21(2)(d) names “supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers” among the required risk-management measures. | A supplier register ordered by observed exposure, with the shared sub-providers resolved. |
| Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026. | ||
| DPDP Act and CERT-In directions, India | Section 8(5) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 requires a Data Fiduciary to protect personal data “by taking reasonable security safeguards to prevent personal data breach”, including processing done on its behalf by a Data Processor. CERT-In’s directions of 28 April 2022 require listed cyber incidents to be reported “within 6 hours of noticing such incidents”. | When an exposure was first observed, what it was attributed to and when it closed: the dates a six-hour clock is measured against. |
| Sources: the Act as published by MeitY, and CERT-In’s directions under section 70B(6) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, both read 18 November 2026. | ||
HIPAA Security Rule, United States
- What the text says
- 45 CFR 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) requires a covered entity or business associate to “conduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information”. Under 164.308(b)(1) a covered entity may let a business associate handle that information only on satisfactory assurances that it will be safeguarded.
- What the monitoring record shows
- The internet-facing systems that exist today, dated, and the observed external posture of each business associate between two assurance cycles.
Source: Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 45 CFR 164.308, read 18 November 2026.
NIS2 Directive, European Union
- What the text says
- Annex I lists health as a sector of high criticality, healthcare providers included. Article 21(2)(d) names “supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers” among the required risk-management measures.
- What the monitoring record shows
- A supplier register ordered by observed exposure, with the shared sub-providers resolved.
Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026.
DPDP Act and CERT-In directions, India
- What the text says
- Section 8(5) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 requires a Data Fiduciary to protect personal data “by taking reasonable security safeguards to prevent personal data breach”, including processing done on its behalf by a Data Processor. CERT-In’s directions of 28 April 2022 require listed cyber incidents to be reported “within 6 hours of noticing such incidents”.
- What the monitoring record shows
- When an exposure was first observed, what it was attributed to and when it closed: the dates a six-hour clock is measured against.
Sources: the Act as published by MeitY, and CERT-In’s directions under section 70B(6) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, both read 18 November 2026.
Most used in this sector
Where healthcare programmes start
Attack Surface Management
Continuous outside-in discovery of the internet-facing estate, including the origin infrastructure sitting behind your edge.
Dark Web Monitoring
A proprietary stealer-log collection with permanent raw-source retention, so improved extraction improves your history as well as your present.
Continuous Automated Red-Teaming
Where it is safe and authorised, exposure is tested, not asserted. The evidence, the scope and the audit identifier are handed to you.
Third-Party Risk Management
The same outside-in methodology applied to your vendors, with the identical categories, maths and bands used on your own estate.
The jobs behind them
What teams in this sector ask us to do
- Responding to an exposed secret “A key is sitting in a public repository. Is it live, what does it reach, and whose is it?”
- Seeing every subsidiary from one place “Twelve operating companies, each with their own IT. I cannot answer what we own, let alone what is exposed.”
- Responding to leaked credentials “A credential of ours is in a stealer log. Which ones still open something, and what do we rotate first?”
- Assessing a target before you sign “We are acquiring. Tell me what we are inheriting, from outside, without touching their network.”
- Seeing your payout API exposure from outside “CERT-In says attackers reached payout APIs through test systems and leaked keys. What of ours can they see from outside?”
- Finding the estate nobody registered “Marketing stood up a subdomain three years ago and pointed it at a service that no longer exists.”
- Onboarding a vendor without waiting on a questionnaire “We need a defensible read on a supplier this week, not a spreadsheet they fill in next quarter.”
Questions buyers ask
Before you evaluate this
Does any of this touch clinical systems or medical devices?
ShadowMap works from outside the perimeter. Nothing is installed, no agent runs on a clinical network and no medical device is spoken to. What is in scope is whatever answers from the public internet: portals, gateways, remote-access services and the domains of acquired hospitals. Active validation is switched on gradually during onboarding, and hosts you tag clinical or medical-device-adjacent can be excluded from it by configuration.
We already send every vendor a questionnaire. What changes?
The questionnaire stays, because an attestation carries a signature that an observation cannot. What changes is which vendors receive the full-length version. In the published hospital-network story the group moved 64 vendors, holding roughly 88% of vendor-held patient records, to continuous monitoring and cut full-length questionnaires from 200 vendors to 71. The standard licence includes 20 vendors, and more can be added.
Can ShadowMap tell us whether we meet HIPAA, NIS2 or the DPDP Act?
ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record: what was exposed, when it was first seen, who it was attributed to and when it closed. Whether a regime binds a given entity, and whether its obligations are met, is a determination for your compliance function and its advisers.
How long before the first inventory is usable?
One apex domain is the entire input. The published hospital-group engagement ran external discovery for nineteen days before any active validation was enabled, and its ninety-day review is where the 69% to 96% figure comes from. A written exposure snapshot for one domain is returned in two business days.
Start with the hospital you acquired most recently
Thirty minutes on your own estate: the domains you give us, what answers beneath them, and which vendors resolve to the same sub-provider.