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Bitget says zero-day in third-party security appliances enabled $387.5m theft

Bitget says attackers used a zero-day in two third-party security appliances to reach its wallet infrastructure and steal $387.5 million on 25 September. The exchange halted withdrawals, blamed North Korean hackers and says the affected functionality stays disabled until the vendor fixes it.

· First published

The short version

  • The theft. Bitget lost $387.5 million from its hot and warm wallets after attackers reached the wallet system through two compromised third-party security appliances. The exchange halted all withdrawals and disclosed the unauthorised transfers on 24 September.
  • How the attackers got in. SlowMist traces the first malicious activity to 31 August, when a hidden script on a node of one appliance read a database password from an environment variable. Mandiant says the actor later held privileged access to both appliances, left a web shell on one and used it to reach the production wallet job server.
  • What was taken. Bitget lists affected assets including XRP, ETH, USDT and ZEC on 11 blockchains, while its chief executive named seven chains. Circle, Tether and NEAR Intents froze close to $632,700 of the proceeds.
  • The attribution. Bitget's chief executive Gracy Chen blames North Korean hackers, citing IP behaviour patterns and on-chain analysis; Bitget also points to wallet overlaps found by Elliptic and TRM Labs with earlier hacks. No government agency is cited as confirming this.
  • The response. Bitget says it notified the third-party vendor and disabled the affected functionality until a fix is ready, and it has opened a recovery bounty programme offering 5% for help freezing or recovering the funds.

Timeline

DateEvent
31 AugustSlowMist dates the earliest malicious activity to this day: a hidden script on one node of "Product A" reads an environment variable holding the database password and connects to the database.
23 SeptemberSimilar hidden-script activity is observed on a second node, according to SlowMist.
24 SeptemberMandiant says the attacker holds unauthorised privileged access to security appliances A and B, drops a web shell on appliance B and opens a command-and-control connection.
24 SeptemberBitget discloses unauthorised transfers from its hot and warm wallets and temporarily halts all withdrawals.
25 SeptemberThe actor accesses Product B's management platform using an internal employee's identity and makes three attempts to inject commands into task parameters, SlowMist says.
25 SeptemberThe bespoke withdrawal tool starts at 01:49 and transfers run from 02:31 to 05:23 (UTC+8) across multiple blockchains.
30 SeptemberBitget states that investigations identified malicious activity involving third-party security products, including a zero-day vulnerability.

How the intrusion unfolded

Bitget says attackers reached its wallet infrastructure through two third-party security appliances compromised with zero-day exploits. Mandiant, which investigated alongside blockchain security firm SlowMist, says the actor held privileged access to the appliances by 24 September, placed a web shell on one of them and opened a command-and-control channel, then moved to the production wallet job server and deployed malicious packages.

SlowMist's account begins earlier, on 31 August, when a hidden script running under a service process on one node read the database password from an environment variable and connected to the database. The same pattern appeared on two further nodes on 23 and 25 September. On 25 September, SlowMist says, the actor used an employee's identity to reach a second product's management platform and tried three times to inject system commands into task parameters.

According to Bitget, the intruders used that foothold to obtain high-level internal credentials and issue withdrawal commands that bypassed existing risk controls. SlowMist recovered a tailored tool built around the wallet system's withdrawal logic; it started at 01:49 on 25 September and the transfers ran from 02:31 to 05:23 (UTC+8) across several blockchains.

Who is affected and what Bitget has done

The loss falls on Bitget's hot and warm wallets. The two sources describe the spread differently: Bitget lists 11 blockchains, including Ethereum, TRON, Zcash, Algorand and Celestia, while its chief executive is quoted naming seven, among them Ethereum, XRP Ledger, Arbitrum, Avalanche, Optimism, BSC and Base. Assets identified include XRP, ETH, USDT, USDC, ZEC, BNB, AVAX and TRX.

Circle, Tether and NEAR Intents have frozen close to $632,700 of the stolen assets. The exchange says it has notified the third-party vendor and disabled the affected functionality until a fix is complete, and it is offering 5% bounties to anyone who helps freeze or recover funds.

Attribution and context

Bitget attributes the theft to North Korean threat actors, citing IP behaviour patterns and on-chain analysis, and says Elliptic and TRM Labs found wallet overlaps with proceeds from earlier hacks. Neither source reports a government agency or an independent national attribution endorsing that conclusion. The company has not named the security vendors whose appliances were compromised.

The sources place the incident in a pattern of large crypto thefts linked to North Korean actors, citing the Bybit hack in which $1.5 billion was taken from that exchange's ETH cold wallet. Bitget's account of its own case rests on its statements and on investigations by SlowMist and Mandiant.

What is not known yet

  • Which vendor makes the two compromised security appliances, and what the zero-day flaw is — no CVE or advisory is named.
  • Whether a patch has shipped, and whether other customers of the same products were also attacked.
  • How many customers were affected and whether Bitget will cover all losses beyond the roughly $632,700 frozen.
  • Whether North Korean involvement has been confirmed by anyone other than Bitget and the firms it commissioned.

What to do

If you operate wallet or exchange infrastructure

  1. Inventory every network and security appliance that can reach wallet systems, and keep the affected functionality disabled until the vendor's fixed release is applied.
  2. Rotate database passwords and any credentials stored in service environment variables, then move those secrets to a managed secrets store.
  3. Alert on hidden scripts launched under service processes and on command-and-control traffic originating from appliance management planes.
  4. Treat task and parameter endpoints that execute commands as privileged interfaces and require strong authentication and review on them.

If you run third-party security appliances

  1. Restrict management interfaces to a small administrative network and log every session.
  2. Hunt for web shells, unexpected scheduled tasks and new outbound connections on the appliances themselves.
  3. Segment appliances so that a compromise cannot reach production job servers or other high-value systems.

For everyone else

  1. Treat security appliances as high-value targets: they hold credentials and sit close to the systems they protect, so patch them on the vendor's schedule and watch them as closely as you watch your servers.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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