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OpenSSL fixes high-severity DTLS flaw that can leak heap memory in plaintext

OpenSSL published fixes on 29 September for CVE-2026-84782, a high-severity flaw in the DTLS handshake that can send leftover heap memory to the other side of a connection unencrypted, or crash the application. The project has not said whether an attacker can force the condition, and no exploitation has been reported.

· First published

The short version

  • The flaw. OpenSSL patched CVE-2026-84782, rated High, which can carry heap memory to the other party as unencrypted handshake data over DTLS or crash the process, causing a denial of service. It is reachable over the network without authentication or user interaction.
  • Affected versions. The bug affects OpenSSL 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 before their fixed releases. Fixes for 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are available only to premium support customers, and 3.0 stopped receiving public security fixes on 7 September.
  • Distribution patches. Ubuntu issued fixed packages on 29 September and says users must reboot. Debian fixed the flaw in Debian 13, but its security tracker still listed Debian 12 as vulnerable on the morning of 30 September.
  • WolfSSL patches too. WolfSSL released version 5.9.4 on 25 September with fixes for 11 vulnerabilities, three of them high severity and able to bypass peer authentication in certain configurations. No source links these flaws to the OpenSSL bug.
  • No exploitation reported. CISA listed exploitation as none when it assigned a CVSS score of 8.2 on 29 September, and OpenSSL has not reported attacks. OpenSSL has not said whether an attacker can trigger the resend that starts the leak.

Timeline

DateEvent
17 AugustLaurent Gaffie of Secorizon reports the DTLS flaw.
7 SeptemberOpenSSL 3.0 stops receiving public security fixes.
25 SeptemberWolfSSL releases 5.9.4, fixing 11 vulnerabilities.
29 SeptemberOpenSSL releases fixes for CVE-2026-84782 across its supported branches.
29 SeptemberUbuntu publishes fixed packages and CISA assigns the flaw a CVSS score of 8.2, listing exploitation as none.
30 SeptemberDebian's security tracker still lists Debian 12 as vulnerable at 07:36 UTC.

How the DTLS flaw works

DTLS is the variant of TLS used over UDP, and it cuts a large handshake message into fragments that each fit in one datagram. If the connection cannot take more data for the moment, sending pauses part-way through a message, but the resend timer keeps running and can re-send an earlier message. Before the fix, that resend used the paused message's position in the buffer rather than starting again at the beginning of the message being resent.

The resent message therefore went out with the wrong label and carried leftover bytes of the larger message as its body. OpenSSL says the mislabelled message can deliver heap memory to the other side as unencrypted handshake data, and that the application crashes if the read reaches unmapped memory. OpenSSL does not limit the flaw to clients or servers and tested the fix in both roles.

Software is exposed only if it uses OpenSSL for DTLS, which appears in VPNs, VoIP and IoT products, WebRTC data channels and the key setup for internet calls. Laurent Gaffie of Secorizon reported the flaw on 17 August and Ryan Hooper developed the fix. OpenSSL rates it High, one level below Critical, while CISA scored it 8.2 with low confidentiality and high availability impact; OpenSSL notes that outside scores can differ greatly from its own.

Which versions are fixed

OpenSSL 4.0.3 is the fixed release on the 4.0 branch, with corresponding patched releases on 3.6, 3.5 and 3.4 listed in the project's advisory. The 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 branches receive fixes only through premium support. OpenSSL lists no workaround, and recommends moving to 4.0 or the long-term support branch 3.5, or buying a support contract. Anyone who builds OpenSSL 3.0 or ships a copy inside their own product has no public fix.

Ubuntu fixed the flaw on 29 September in its own packages, which keep older OpenSSL version numbers, and says users need to reboot for all changes to take effect. Its notice describes incorrect handshake behaviour or a denial of service and does not mention leaked memory, which is narrower than OpenSSL's own account. Debian shipped a fix for Debian 13 through DSA-6531-1; Debian 12 was still listed as vulnerable as of 07:36 UTC on 30 September.

The same release fixed 13 other OpenSSL flaws. The most serious is CVE-2026-84783, rated Moderate, which affects only OpenSSL 4.0 and can crash a multi-threaded TLS client or a multi-threaded TLS server that asks for client certificates when several connections build their first certificate chains to the same trusted CA at once. The remainder are Low, including five in OpenSSL's QUIC code and three timing side channels in ECDSA and SM2 code.

WolfSSL authentication bypasses

WolfSSL released 5.9.4 on 25 September, patching 11 vulnerabilities, three of them high severity. The high-severity issues allow attackers to bypass peer authentication in certain configurations, and affected builds include those made for integration with Nginx, HAProxy, Stunnel and Apache httpd. No source links the WolfSSL flaws to the OpenSSL flaw; they are separate products patched in the same period.

CVE-2026-93302 arises because WolfSSL ignores the public key when matching a certificate against a trusted peer certificate, so a malicious server that knows which certificate authorities a client trusts can present a forged clone and bypass authentication. CVE-2026-89102 lets an attacker holding any certificate (and its private key) that chains to a trusted CA forge certificates for arbitrary identities. CVE-2026-89136 lets a malicious server bypass authentication on clients with Raw Public Key support by selecting a certificate type the client never requested.

WolfSSL also fixed four medium-severity certificate validation and handshake sequencing defects, which could let an attacker bypass name constraints, plant an unverified CA in the shared certificate manager or complete a handshake in place of the legitimate server. Four low-severity bugs cover a use-after-free at connection shutdown, skipped revocation checks, acceptance of certificates with invalid signatures and server impersonation; most need specific configurations or legacy API use.

What is not known yet

  • Whether an attacker can actually force a resend while a handshake message is stuck, which OpenSSL has not said.
  • Whether the flaw has been exploited; no attacks have been reported and CISA listed exploitation as none on 29 September.
  • What the leaked heap fragments could contain in practice, and whether key material or other sensitive application data can appear in them.
  • Whether the 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 branches are affected; OpenSSL says it did not check.
  • How many third-party products, appliances and embedded devices ship an affected OpenSSL build for DTLS, and whether Debian 12 has since been fixed.

What to do

If you use OpenSSL

  1. Inventory where your systems terminate DTLS with OpenSSL, including VPN concentrators, VoIP gateways, IoT devices and WebRTC services.
  2. Upgrade to the fixed release for your branch as listed in the OpenSSL advisory; 4.0.3 is the fixed release on the 4.0 branch.
  3. If you build OpenSSL 3.0 yourself or ship it inside a product, move to 4.0 or the long-term support branch 3.5, or take out a support contract, because no public fix exists and OpenSSL lists no workaround.
  4. On Ubuntu, install the updated libssl packages and reboot the host afterwards.

If you use WolfSSL

  1. Upgrade to 5.9.4 and rebuild the applications that link against the library, including Nginx, HAProxy, Stunnel and Apache httpd builds.
  2. Review configurations that rely on peer certificate matching with the product's advisory, since the bypasses depend on specific settings.

For everyone else

  1. List the endpoints in your estate that speak DTLS to untrusted networks and confirm which library each one uses, since exposure depends on running OpenSSL for DTLS rather than on the application alone.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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