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CWPdoor backdoor found in Control Web Panel's cwpsrv server binary

Researchers at QiAnXin's XLab have found a Linux backdoor, CWPdoor, in a modified version of cwpsrv, the web server behind the Control Web Panel (CWP) hosting interface. The backdoor waits for signed web requests and runs commands without logging them; installing it requires root access.

· First published

The short version

  • The malware. XLab found CWPdoor, a passive Linux backdoor built into modified versions of cwpsrv, the web server used by Control Web Panel (CWP). It stays dormant until it receives a correctly signed and timestamped web request, then runs the command and suppresses the request from access logs.
  • The infection route. The installer poses as an update and replaces cwpsrv 1.15.10 or 1.24.0. It needs root access, so the attacker must already control the server; XLab does not know how that access is obtained.
  • Discovery. XLab captured the installer on 29 June 2026. On 30 September an archive containing the backdoor and the Ebury malware was uploaded to VirusTotal from Brazil; the researchers say the zero-detection result indicates real victims, but give no count.
  • Exposure. XLab says more than 340,000 CWP instances were exposed on the public web in the month before its report. That is an exposure count, not a count of infected servers.

Timeline

DateEvent
29 JuneXLab captures a shell script posing as a cwpsrv update and installing CWPdoor.
30 SeptemberAn archive containing a CWPdoor binary and Ebury is uploaded to VirusTotal from Brazil.
5 NovemberBleepingComputer reports XLab's findings.

How CWPdoor runs

CWPdoor is the cwpsrv program rebuilt with extra code, according to XLab's analysis. A request carrying valid X-Ngx-Integrity headers is checked against a five-minute timestamp window and a signature, then its encrypted command is passed to a helper process. The backdoor also stops the triggering request from appearing in access logs.

How it is installed

The installer is a shell script posing as a version update. It replaces cwpsrv 1.15.10 or 1.24.0 with a trojanised copy, restores file and directory timestamps, deletes temporary files and wipes the command-history log. Installing it requires root access. XLab does not know how attackers obtain that access, so the first compromise remains unexplained.

Exposure and the Ebury link

CWP, formerly CentOS Web Panel, is an open-source web hosting administration tool for Linux servers, with functions similar to cPanel and Plesk. XLab says more than 340,000 CWP instances were exposed on the public web in the month before its report. Exposure is not proof of compromise, and the researchers give no count of infected servers.

An archive uploaded to VirusTotal from Brazil on 30 September held CWPdoor and the Ebury backdoor, which steals credentials and has been active since at least 2009. The malicious cwpsrv file had no detections out of 63. XLab says the connection between the two remains unclear and different attackers may have planted them on the same server.

What is not known yet

  • How the attackers obtain the root access that the installer requires.
  • How many CWP servers are infected and which organisations run them.
  • Whether the attackers have taken data or used the access for other activity.
  • Who is behind the campaign and whether it is connected to Ebury.
  • Whether Control Web Panel has published its own advisory, fixed build or statement about CWPdoor.

What to do

If you run CWP

  1. Check for the backdoor with XLab's three tests: run ss -axp | grep integrity for the ngx_http_integrity_helper socket, run ps aux | grep cwpsrv for unexpected helper processes, and run strings /usr/local/cwpsrv/bin/cwpsrv | grep X-Ngx-Integrity.
  2. If any test is positive, treat the server as compromised: restore cwpsrv from a known-good copy or reinstall it, then upgrade CWP to the latest version.
  3. Rotate all control panel credentials, because the backdoor can run any command.
  4. Investigate the host for additional malware, including Ebury, and confirm that ss -axp | grep integrity returns nothing after cleanup.

If you manage Linux hosting servers

  1. Include CWP servers in integrity monitoring, because the installer resets file timestamps to hide the replaced binary.
  2. Watch for gaps in web-server access logs or unexpected cwpsrv helper processes, which XLab lists as signs to check.
  3. Do not rely on an open-port scan alone: XLab found the backdoor on a server whose port list looked normal, so use the socket check as well.

For everyone else

  1. Treat a root compromise on any server as a whole-host incident and rebuild or restore from trusted media rather than only deleting a suspicious file.
  2. Verify critical binaries against a known baseline, because a valid-looking cwpsrv binary and normal logs are not proof of integrity.
  3. Treat a zero-detection result from a malware scanner as inconclusive, as the CWPdoor file showed no detections on VirusTotal at the time.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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