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Turla used new Cereal malware to intercept email on government Exchange servers

ESET says the Russian group Turla used a previously undocumented toolkit, Cereal, to collect email from Microsoft Exchange servers at government organisations in Kazakhstan and Romania. In Romania the malware was configured to gather correspondence with NATO and EU institutions.

· First published

The short version

  • The campaign. ESET attributes the intrusions to Turla, a long-running espionage group linked to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). Targets were two government organisations, one in Kazakhstan and one in Romania, both running Microsoft Exchange.
  • How it hides. A component called CerealBox injects into Exchange's email transport process and filters messages by attachment type, sender, recipient and subject. The attackers issued commands through the compromised server itself, so there was no external command-and-control (C2) infrastructure to detect or block.
  • What was collected. In Romania the malware was set to collect messages exchanged with NATO and EU institutional addresses. ESET could not establish how the attackers gained initial access or how much email they obtained.
  • Detection data. ESET published an extended list of indicators of compromise (IoCs) on its GitHub page alongside the report.

Timeline

DateEvent
November 2025ESET first identifies the Cereal toolset on a government Exchange server in Kazakhstan.
23 December 2025A Romanian government organisation is compromised with the same toolset, according to ESET.
10 November 2026ESET publishes its report and indicators of compromise.

What ESET found

ESET published its research on 10 November 2026, attributing the intrusions to Turla, also tracked as Snake and Secret Blizzard. The group has been active for more than two decades and is linked to Russia's FSB. The two victims ESET names are government bodies in Kazakhstan and Romania, both running Microsoft Exchange email servers.

ESET says it found the toolset first in Kazakhstan in November 2025 and again about a month later in Romania, where the organisation was compromised on 23 December 2025. The Romanian configuration collected correspondence with NATO and EU representatives. In Kazakhstan the intrusion coincided with growing scrutiny of Russian exiles and Kremlin critics, but ESET could not determine whether the attackers were looking for information about dissidents.

How the toolset works

CerealBox injects itself into EdgeTransport.exe, the Exchange service that processes mail traffic, and hijacks existing transport agents. It looks for messages carrying .DOC, .DOCX or .PDF attachments that match hard-coded lists of senders, recipients, subject lines or attachment names. Matching mail is compressed, encrypted, staged in files on disk, then exfiltrated and deleted.

Commands reach the server through CerealNeuron, which listens for encrypted web requests on paths that resemble legitimate Exchange services. It decrypts each request, runs a supplied payload in memory and encrypts the output before sending it back. ESET says the commands can retrieve mailboxes or messages, query Active Directory, run Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) queries, extract LSA Secrets, list volume snapshots and perform file operations.

A variant called CerealHermit has no network capability and reads its commands from encrypted files on disk, which ESET suggests could be a fallback when the web channel is unavailable. The researchers did not explain how those command files are placed on the server or how results are retrieved. Cereal gets its name from the toolkit's heavy use of serialisation, the conversion of objects into a format that can be stored or transmitted.

Targeting and context

ESET says the absence of external control servers is what makes the campaign hard to disrupt: the compromised Exchange server is the only control point, and it belongs to the victim. The researchers say the technique of using an infected Exchange server as an operational hub has been documented in only a handful of espionage groups.

ESET could not determine how the attackers initially gained access to either network. It notes that Turla has previously used spear-phishing, watering-hole attacks and adversary-in-the-middle interception carried out at internet service provider level. The group has targeted government agencies, diplomatic missions and defence organisations across Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East.

According to ESET, about 70% of the countries Turla has targeted since 2022 are former Soviet republics or European countries with historical ties to the Soviet Union. Neither affected government has issued its own statement in the sources available.

What is not known yet

  • How the attackers obtained initial access to the Kazakhstan and Romanian government networks.
  • How many mailboxes or messages were collected, and how long the intruders retained access.
  • Whether the same toolset has been found at other organisations that have not been identified.
  • How CerealHermit's encrypted command files were placed on the server and how their output reached the attackers.
  • Whether the Kazakhstan intrusion was aimed at information about Russian exiles and Kremlin critics.

What to do

If you run Exchange on-premises

  1. Search Exchange servers for the indicators of compromise ESET published on its GitHub page.
  2. Check whether EdgeTransport.exe is loading .NET assemblies or transport agents your team did not configure.
  3. Review Exchange web logs for requests to paths that imitate legitimate Exchange services, particularly ones carrying encrypted content.
  4. Look for staged, encrypted files on mail server disks and for mail being read or deleted outside normal journaling and archiving.

If you are a government or diplomatic organisation

  1. Brief incident response that ESET found no external command-and-control traffic, so egress monitoring alone would not show this compromise, and that the evidence sits on the mail server itself.
  2. Give your detection team the full ESET indicator list rather than relying on generic Exchange signatures.
  3. Since the entry route is unknown, review controls against spear-phishing, watering-hole sites and interception of connections at the network provider level.

For everyone else

  1. Treat internet-facing mail and collaboration servers as potential collection points, not just delivery systems, and monitor for code running inside their legitimate processes.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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