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Attackers hijack .gh, .sl and .as registries to obtain HTTPS certificates for Google domains

Attackers compromised the operators of three country-code top-level domains and changed authoritative DNS records to obtain valid HTTPS certificates for Google and YouTube sites. Google says its own systems were not breached, Chrome blocked the certificates, and some unnamed global brands were affected too.

· First published

The short version

  • The hijack. Attackers took control of DNS records at the operators of three country-code top-level domains: .gh for Ghana, .sl for Sierra Leone and .as for American Samoa. Google said on 6 October that they used that control to obtain HTTPS certificates for Google and YouTube domains, and that its own systems were not breached.
  • The certificates. Certificate Transparency logs, the public record of issued certificates, show at least 12 certificates for seven Google and YouTube names under the three domains, logged between 22 and 27 September. Let's Encrypt issued 11 of them and ZeroSSL one.
  • The response. Chrome blocked the certificates through CRLSets, its emergency blocking mechanism, and the issuing authorities revoked all 12 by 1 October. Google says it also blocked certificates it found for other organisations and contacted them where it could.
  • Other victims. Google said certificate log data pointed to other organisations it believes were hit by the same attacks, including well-known global brands and widely used online services. It has not named them or said how many were affected.

Timeline

DateEvent
22 SeptemberCertificates for google.com.gh and youtube.com.gh first appear in Certificate Transparency logs.
25 SeptemberCertificates for google.sl, google.com.sl and youtube.sl are logged, issued by Let's Encrypt and ZeroSSL.
26 SeptemberThe two .gh certificates and the ZeroSSL .sl certificate are revoked.
27 SeptemberCertificates for google.as and youtube.as are logged.
1 OctoberThe nine remaining certificates are revoked.
6 OctoberGoogle discloses the hijacks and the unauthorised certificates.
7 OctoberA Let's Encrypt staff member confirms on the CA's forum that certificates were issued and revoked; The Hacker News reports finding the certificates through CT search services.

How the hijack produced valid certificates

The attackers compromised third-party operators of three country-code top-level domains and changed authoritative DNS records. That control let them answer the domain checks certificate authorities (CAs) perform before issuance, which normally means placing a specific record in the domain's DNS. With certificates in hand, they could present the domains over an encrypted connection and serve visitors whatever content they chose.

Google said the incident did not involve a compromise of its systems and that it had no reason to believe the CAs acted improperly. It did not name the domains, the attackers, or explain how the three registry operators were compromised.

What the logs show and what was done

The Hacker News found the certificates on 7 October through the CT search services ctlogs.dev and Cert Spotter. The 12 certificates covered seven domains and were logged one ccTLD at a time: .gh on 22 September, .sl on 25 September and .as on 27 September. All were domain-validated. In the records reviewed, every other certificate for google.com.gh, google.sl and google.as came from Google Trust Services, Google's own CA.

Matthew McPherrin of Let's Encrypt wrote on the CA's community forum: "Yes, certificates for Google and YouTube were issued, and have been revoked." The two .gh certificates and the ZeroSSL certificate were revoked on 26 September and the other nine on 1 October. Chrome blocked Google's certificates through CRLSets, its mechanism for rapidly blocking certificates in an emergency, and Google also had certificates it linked to the same attacks blocked in Chrome.

Google said it learned of the hijacks the week before its 6 October post and acted immediately, without giving dates for the hijacks or its own actions. It said it could not guarantee that its analysis identified every affected domain, and that Chrome's blocks do not reliably protect people using other browsers.

What domain owners are advised to do

Google's guidance is to watch CT logs for every domain you own, including parked domains and regional names, and to publish a strict CAA record. A CAA record is a DNS entry naming the CAs allowed to issue certificates for a domain, and a CA must check it first. Google recommends tying the record to your own account at the CA, which only works where the CA supports that option.

A CAA record cannot stop issuance while a DNS hijack is under way, because an attacker who controls DNS can remove or alter it. It matters afterwards: CAs may reuse a completed domain check for later requests, so a record that blocks the reuse of cached validation stops an attacker who passed the check during the hijack from obtaining more certificates. Under the CA/Browser Forum baseline requirements that reuse window is up to 200 days, falling to 100 days in March 2027 and 10 days in March 2029. Let's Encrypt says it reuses a check for 30 days and plans to cut that to seven hours by 2028.

Anyone can file a Certificate Problem Report with the issuing CA, which must investigate and report its first findings within 24 hours. Each of the seven Google domains carried a strict CAA record on 7 October naming only pki.goog, the domain of Google Trust Services.

What is not known yet

  • Who carried out the hijacks, and whether any state or criminal group is suspected.
  • How the operators of the .gh, .sl and .as domains were compromised, and whether they have since been secured.
  • Whether any of the certificates was used to impersonate a Google or YouTube site or to read data sent by visitors.
  • How many certificates were issued in total, and which other organisations were affected.
  • Whether any of the affected registries or domain owners outside Google have disclosed the incident.

What to do

If you own a domain under .gh, .sl or .as

  1. Review recent Certificate Transparency log entries for any certificate for your names that you did not request.
  2. Report each unrequested certificate to the CA that issued it as a Certificate Problem Report.

If you run domains anywhere

  1. Monitor CT logs across your whole portfolio, including parked domains and regional ccTLD names, and alert on unexpected issuance.
  2. Publish a strict CAA record naming only the CAs you use, tied to your own account at the CA where supported.
  3. Keep that record in place after regaining DNS control so cached domain validation cannot be reused against you.

For everyone else

  1. Chrome users need take no action for this incident.
  2. Do not assume a browser's certificate blocklist protects your own domain's users; Google says domain owners should not rely on it.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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