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Google disrupts XCPE botnet of 1.3 million TV boxes and bans maker Videostrong

Google and industry partners took down the servers behind a botnet of more than 1.3 million Android devices, most of them TV set-top boxes, and Google says Chinese manufacturer Videostrong built the backdoor into its firmware and sold access to criminals. The malware stays on the devices and reinstalls itself after removal.

· First published

The short version

  • The takedown. Google took legal action in late October against the domains and servers controlling the XCPE botnet and announced the operation on 2 November. Japan's National Police Agency, Lumen, HUMAN Security, Plume, Synthient and TrendAI worked with Google.
  • The attribution. Google says with high confidence that Shenzhen-based Videostrong Technology built the x.cpe backdoor into firmware across many models and brands and sold access to criminal affiliates. Google revoked its licence and banned the company and any future affiliates from making certified Android devices.
  • The scale. TrendAI counted 1,472,554 infected devices across 206 models between 3 June and 1 October. Malaysia, Brazil, Iraq, Mexico and Taiwan had the most infections; the US, Germany, UK, Australia and Canada had roughly 26,000 to 42,000 each.
  • What the devices did. Modules turned the boxes into residential proxies, generated fraudulent ad views and installed further malware. Google expects the action to cut criminals off from at least 10 million more compromised devices that were infected by other means.
  • The devices stay infected. x.cpe sits in the firmware and reinstalls itself from the /oem/ partition when a box restarts. TrendAI says cleanup needs vendor action, platform protection or replacement of the device; Synthient tells consumers to discard the boxes.

Timeline

DateEvent
Late 2024Videostrong begins using a separate loader, com.abc.nexus, to run malicious modules while the backdoor handles command-and-control traffic.
Late 2025Synthient buys a MECOOL KM9PRO Max Android TV box and finds the backdoor preinstalled.
3 June - 1 Oct 2026TrendAI records 1,472,554 infected devices across 206 models.
Late October 2026Google and partners take down the botnet's command-and-control domains and servers.
2 November 2026Google announces the disruption, the attribution to Videostrong and the ban on the manufacturer.

How the backdoor was built

x.cpe, also tracked as com.oemservice, runs as a system app with system-level privileges inside the firmware, according to Google's analysis. It contacts a command-and-control server on anyevonline[.]com, obtains credentials for an MQTT message broker (a relay that carries commands to devices) at mqtt.szbboys[.]com, and waits for orders. Google describes three stages: the persistent backdoor, a loader that executes modules, and the modules that earn money for whoever operates them.

Operators could install apps without the owner's knowledge, switch off Google Play Protect, run commands, capture screenshots, inject keystrokes, and collect account details, device information, app lists and system logs. They could also map the local network and open reverse shells. Most modules enrolled the boxes in residential proxy services, which sell access to a household internet connection so a customer's traffic appears to come from an ordinary home, or faked views of online ads. Proxy components named by Google include Linkfog, AppSalt/Honeygain, GaGaNode, NetNut and Traffmonetizer.

Synthient, which worked with Google, bought a MECOOL KM9PRO Max box in late 2025 and found the backdoor preinstalled. It also found a document signed by Videostrong's research and development director in an open folder on one of the botnet's servers, and a Videostrong domain resolving to the same address as a control server; Synthient also found that numerous Videostrong company email addresses had been used to sign the backdoors. Google says the campaign was not a rogue insider or a development oversight.

Who is affected

Most infected devices are Android TV set-top boxes, but Google says the backdoor also appeared on telehealth devices, karaoke machines and digital signage. TrendAI's count of 1,472,554 devices covers 206 models; its figure is for 3 June to 1 October and the real total is at least that high. Plume says the botnet included both Google-certified devices and devices running the open-source AOSP version of Android; Google's report does not say how many certified devices were affected.

Synthient focused on MECOOL-branded boxes, which it links to Videostrong, and examined a MECOOL device sold by the publicly traded Chinese company Skyworth Technology. Plume found more than a dozen different devices talking to the botnet's control server, most of them MECOOL. Synthient has published 182 model names seen in the campaign but warns that a model name alone does not confirm a box is infected.

The takedown and what remains

Google used legal action to take down the domains and servers Videostrong used, and also the control domains of more than a dozen malware families that were loaded through the backdoor. It says the affiliates distributed their modules by other routes too, so the action should cut their access to at least 10 million further compromised devices, some of them not Android. Google banned Videostrong and any future subsidiaries or affiliates from certified Android devices and from supplying software to certified makers, and has changed its certification review after finding that Videostrong used obfuscation to load code after a device's first boot.

The malware itself has not been removed. It reinstalls itself from the /oem/ partition if deleted, and TrendAI says cleanup requires vendor action, platform protection or device replacement. Plume recommends a full factory reset because other modules may have installed additional backdoors, but does not say whether a reset removes x.cpe; Synthient advises consumers to throw the boxes away. Charley Snyder, head of disruption operations at Google Threat Intelligence Group, told The Record that severing the domains had left the malware "effectively rendering the malware benign." Google has not said whether owners will be notified or the malware removed remotely.

Google sued over the BadBox 2.0 botnet in July 2025, when more than 10 million devices involved were uncertified. It warns that backdoor operators, ad-fraud rings and proxy providers work as an interconnected supply chain and switch tools quickly when one part is disrupted. Videostrong did not respond to requests for comment, and on 2 November its website still listed products it calls Google-certified.

What is not known yet

  • The total number of infected devices. TrendAI recorded 1,472,554 and Synthient's founder called that figure highly conservative, but no full count exists.
  • How many Google-certified devices were infected compared with uncertified AOSP devices; Google's report does not break the figure down.
  • Whether a factory reset removes x.cpe from the firmware, which Plume's guidance leaves unresolved.
  • Whether owners of infected devices will be told and whether any forced cleanup will take place; Google has not said.
  • What action, if any, Videostrong faces beyond losing its Android certification. The company has not commented.

What to do

If you own or manage Android TV boxes

  1. Check your device against Synthient's list of 182 model names and its indicators, remembering that a matching name alone does not confirm infection.
  2. Disconnect any MECOOL or similar device that matches the indicators and dispose of it, as Synthient advises.
  3. If a device cannot be removed, at minimum disconnect it from the internet and keep it off the same network as anything sensitive.
  4. A factory reset is what Plume recommends, but it has not confirmed that a reset removes x.cpe itself.

If you run a corporate network

  1. Block the command-and-control domains and IP addresses listed in Synthient's report, including anyevonline[.]com, at your network boundary.
  2. Treat unmanaged consumer devices on staff home networks as part of your attack surface and keep corporate access behind managed devices, as TrendAI advises.

For everyone else

  1. Keep smart devices and media boxes on a separate network segment from work and sensitive systems.
  2. Before buying a connected device, check that the seller issues and supports firmware updates, because preinstalled code cannot be audited or removed by the buyer.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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