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Bitdefender finds ad-fraud and proxy malware preinstalled on low-cost Android phones

Malware embedded in the firmware of low-cost Android phones installs disguised apps that generate fraudulent advertising revenue and can turn the handsets into residential proxy relays, which route other people's traffic through the owner's connection. Bitdefender, which named the campaign Midnight Mimosa, says affected devices span more than 150 countries.

· First published

The short version

  • The malware. Bitdefender says software it calls Midnight Mimosa ships inside the firmware of low-cost Android phones built on MediaTek chips, present before the owner first switches the device on. It runs with system-level privileges and cannot be removed through Android's normal uninstall process.
  • What it does. The preinstalled component silently installs disguised utility apps that load real ads in invisible windows, producing impressions and clicks nobody sees. Some variants also register the phone as a residential proxy, relaying other parties' network traffic through the owner's connection.
  • Scale and reach. Bitdefender observed the malware on thousands of devices in more than 150 countries over roughly two years, with Mexico, France and Italy the largest shares. Many appear to be white-label or counterfeit handsets sold through mainstream online marketplaces, some imitating Samsung Galaxy and Apple iPhone models.
  • Play Store apps. Researchers also found 13 apps on Google Play carrying the same ad-fraud code and contacting the same infrastructure, distributed under 13 signing certificates and at least two developer accounts. They lack system privileges but can still show ads outside their own interface.
  • No attribution. Bitdefender has not established who placed the malware or where in the supply chain it was introduced. Some affected firmware was signed with certificates bearing the name Shenzhen Zediel, which Bitdefender says does not show the company created or knowingly distributed the malware, or was aware of it.

How the infection works

Bitdefender's App Anomaly Detection flagged a system application called com.android.system.lite that was silently installing and removing other apps. Investigation found a framework that fetches configuration from command-and-control servers and downloads further modules. The malicious packages use names that mimic Android system components, including com.android.sys.prot and com.android.sys.gmsprot, and are signed and run with elevated privileges.

The money comes from roughly 32 dropped apps disguised as weather tools, note-taking apps, app lockers, file managers, OCR tools and audio editors. They load genuine advertisements through legitimate advertising software development kits and display them in invisible windows on top of other apps, and some generate automated clicks. Before installing a payload the malware disables the Google Play Store, apparently to avoid Play Protect, then re-enables it; some variants falsify installer records so apps look as if they came from Google Play.

A second capability turns infected phones into relay nodes. An app locker package, com.mobile.applock.en, contains a TCP proxy component that registers the device with a remote command server, which can then instruct it to connect to chosen hosts and forward traffic. Bitdefender confirmed the proxy infrastructure was live and accepting registrations, but its own test device received no relay targets, so it could not confirm that traffic was being forwarded.

Which devices are affected

The campaign covers devices from several brands on MediaTek platforms, including models sold under the Doogee S200 X and Cubot KINGKONG X names, alongside phones impersonating Samsung Galaxy and Apple iPhone products; one device Bitdefender examined cost about $180. On the XDA forums, owners reported suspicious apps that reinstalled themselves after removal, and one Doogee Fire 3 Max owner said an official firmware update brought the malware back after an older firmware version had cleared it.

Some users said manufacturers later released firmware updates that removed the infection, but the manufacturers have not publicly explained how the malicious software entered their firmware. Removal is difficult by design: because the component sits in the system partition, owners cannot uninstall it normally. Bitdefender says clearing a device needs firmware-level cleanup or disabling the component using the Android Debug Bridge (ADB), and that neither is realistic for most owners.

Supply chain and context

Bitdefender lists several points where the tampering could have happened: an original device manufacturer, a firmware integrator, a logistics partner or another intermediary before sale. Certificates naming Shenzhen Zediel appear on some affected firmware, and Bitdefender says it also detected other company names during its investigation. The researchers state that the certificates do not establish who created or knowingly distributed the malware.

Bitdefender noted overlaps between the Midnight Mimosa infrastructure and Android.Phantom, a click-fraud family that Doctor Web documented inside modified games and popular apps. The article also noted Keenadu, preinstalled ad-fraud malware that Kaspersky disclosed on some Android tablets late last year. The researchers argue that preinstalled software defeats the defences users normally rely on, and that the durable fix belongs with the vendors and marketplaces that ship and sell the affected firmware.

What is not known yet

  • Who built and operates the malware, and which organisation or intermediary inserted it into the firmware.
  • The total number of infected devices; the sources give "thousands" and country shares but no figure.
  • Whether the residential proxy component has actually carried traffic for its operators in the wild.
  • Whether device and installed-app data collected by the malware left the handsets, and what it was used for.
  • Whether Google has removed the 13 identified Play Store apps or acted against the two developer accounts.

What to do

If you own a low-cost Android phone

  1. Check for system apps named com.android.system.lite, com.android.sys.prot or com.android.sys.gmsprot, and watch whether unfamiliar apps reappear after you delete them.
  2. Take firmware only from the manufacturer's official channel and check whether the current version clears the component; one owner reported the malware returning with an official update.
  3. If the device is infected, treat it as untrusted until it is reflashed at firmware level or the component is disabled over the Android Debug Bridge (ADB).
  4. Do not count on uninstalling the app or on Play Protect to remove it.

If you manage Android devices for an organisation

  1. Inventory white-label, no-name and unusually cheap Android handsets in your estate, particularly MediaTek-based models bought through online marketplaces.
  2. Search managed devices for the 13 package names Bitdefender published and remove any that are present.
  3. Keep unverified low-cost phones off corporate networks and out of device trust until their firmware source is confirmed.

For everyone else

  1. Weigh provenance at purchase: when malware arrives before first boot, install prompts, store review, Play Protect and uninstall all assume a step the owner never gets, so buying hardware with accountable firmware and update support is the control that applies.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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