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ConnectWise confirms Cloud Backup compromise and suspends services

ConnectWise has confirmed unauthorised access to its Cloud Backup environment and shut down several services after what Microsoft and Huntress describe as a supply chain attack. Attackers used a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential to reach customers' Microsoft 365 environments, and Microsoft attributes the activity to the China state-aligned group Storm-0940.

· First published

The short version

  • The breach. ConnectWise confirmed unauthorised access to its Cloud Backup environment and suspended Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management while it investigated.
  • The access path. Huntress says a compromised ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was used to reach customers' Microsoft 365 environments, and Microsoft says attackers likely abused permissions customers had already granted the application.
  • The scale. Huntress saw unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants, and Microsoft attributes the activity to the China state-aligned group Storm-0940, which attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 tenants.
  • The response. ConnectWise revoked certificates and invalidated shared Cloud Backup credentials, says it has seen no successful threat activity since, and says it has no indication backup data was compromised but cannot rule out individual tenant breaches.

Timeline

DateEvent
10-14 OctMicrosoft observes Storm-0940 infrastructure running an automated cross-tenant password-spray campaign against 327 accounts at eight organisations, with no successful authentication detected in that window.
13-14 OctHuntress sees password-spray attacks against four law firms.
15 OctAttackers gain access to identities of multiple ConnectWise cloud applications and use them to authenticate to customer environments; Huntress sees about 50 monitored systems use ConnectWise Cloud Management apps to assign directory or administrative roles.
19 OctThe Record reports that ConnectWise has suspended Cloud Backup and other services after the supply chain attack.

What happened

ConnectWise confirmed unauthorised access to its Cloud Backup environment after cybersecurity companies warned of a supply chain attack. It shut down Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management while it investigated. It later revoked certificates used for affected application connections, invalidated shared Cloud Backup credentials, and said it had seen no successful threat activity since. It has not given a timeline for full restoration.

Huntress says a credential belonging to ConnectWise Cloud Backup was compromised and used to reach customers' Microsoft 365 environments. Microsoft says the attackers likely abused permissions customers had granted the application, including Directory.ReadWrite.All, a high-level permission that allows directory changes. The backup service needs broad access to mail, files, Teams and directory data, so an attacker using its credentials inherits that access.

Who is affected

Huntress observed unauthorised sign-ins in 162 tenants. It first saw password-spray attacks against four law firms on 13 and 14 October, then saw attackers use ConnectWise Cloud Management apps to assign themselves directory or administrative roles in about 50 monitored systems by 15 October. A second wave targeted policy, national security, trade and critical-mineral sectors but mostly failed because those tenants did not use the relevant ConnectWise application.

Microsoft says Storm-0940 attempted sign-ins to more than 2,250 tenants during the ConnectWise incident. ConnectWise says it cannot see into partner and customer environments, so it cannot determine whether a particular customer's Microsoft 365 environment was breached. It also says it has no indication that backup data was compromised. Huntress warns that a foothold at a managed service provider can be used against other customers.

Attribution and tactics

Microsoft says Storm-0940 used ARTEX, a Go-based AI penetration-testing framework that can carry out tasks automatically, to run reconnaissance, password spraying and OAuth application abuse. Between 10 and 14 October its infrastructure tried 327 accounts across eight organisations, with no successful authentication detected in that window. On 15 October the group gained access to identities of multiple ConnectWise cloud applications and used them to authenticate to customer environments.

Microsoft says the AI agents moved beyond authentication in some cases, performing directory reconnaissance, changing application credentials to establish persistence, and modifying identities, groups and privileged roles. It says such changes can remain active as a backdoor after the original application is addressed. ConnectWise says services are being restored in phases and that the process will take several days.

What is not known yet

  • The number of ConnectWise customers or downstream tenants that were actually breached.
  • Whether customer data, including backup data, was accessed or copied.
  • How the ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was first compromised.
  • Whether attacker-created credentials or roles remain in customer environments after ConnectWise's remediation.
  • When full service restoration will be completed.

What to do

If you use ConnectWise Cloud Backup

  1. Do not reconnect the application until ConnectWise confirms that affected connections and credentials have been replaced and service is restored.
  2. Review Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace audit logs from 10 October for sign-ins and permission changes by the ConnectWise Cloud Backup application.
  3. Check for new directory roles, applications, credentials, mailbox rules and Conditional Access changes, and remove anything you did not authorise.
  4. Rotate credentials and secrets that the backup application could read.

If you run a managed service provider (MSP)

  1. Inventory every customer tenant where ConnectWise Cloud Backup or other high-privilege applications are consented.
  2. Review delegated permissions, especially Directory.ReadWrite.All, and reduce them to the minimum needed.
  3. Notify customers and help them review application sign-ins and role changes; a foothold in one tenant can reach others.

For everyone else

  1. Limit third-party application permissions to least privilege and review them regularly.
  2. Alert on application credential changes, new role assignments and unusual application sign-ins, not only user sign-ins.
  3. After a supplier credential incident, look for attacker-created persistence rather than assuming credential rotation is enough.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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