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ConnectWise ScreenConnect attacks continue as SCKit toolkit targets MSPs

Attackers are abusing an authentication weakness in a third-party ScreenConnect extension to break into managed service providers' remote-support environments and install rogue remote-access clients. This report covers what Huntress, Blackpoint Cyber and ConnectWise have confirmed, the SCKit toolkit built to spread the intrusion to technicians' workstations, and what remains unproven.

· First published

The short version

  • The attacks. Intruders reached cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments and used the platform's Run Command feature to install unauthorised ScreenConnect remote-access clients on customer endpoints. Huntress counted at least 288 endpoints at 48 organisations, all hit within 90 minutes.
  • The entry point. Huntress believes access came through RMM+, a third-party extension whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank shared access key, letting commands run without a ScreenConnect login or MFA. ConnectWise has disabled five extensions across about 400 partner environments.
  • The toolkit. Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber analysed SCKit, a set of 16 scripts and components. Its RelayTrap module waits for a technician to connect to an infected customer device and tries to push an executable back to the technician's machine; other SCKit components would then attempt to steal the management session.
  • Unproven spread. Neither firm has seen the worm-like step succeed. Blackpoint reproduced the attempt against a current client, patched in version 26.6.5, and the payload never executed; Huntress says the console takeover failed in every host log it examined.
  • Ongoing activity. Huntress reported a second spike on 13 November affecting 205 hosts at 41 organisations. ConnectWise says activity continues against on-premises environments where the extensions remain enabled and ScreenConnect is not updated.

Timeline

DateEvent
11-12 NovWidespread attacks on cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments are reported, with attackers using Run Command to install rogue remote-access clients on customer endpoints.
12 NovHuntress publishes an updated count of at least 288 endpoints across 48 organisations, and it and Blackpoint Cyber publish analyses of the SCKit toolkit.
13 NovHuntress detects another spike in SCKit-related activity, affecting 205 hosts across 41 organisations.
16 NovConnectWise says it has completed its investigation into unauthorised access against partner ScreenConnect environments.

How the attackers got in

The campaign hit cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments, the remote-support platform that managed service providers (MSPs) and IT teams use to manage customer devices. According to Huntress, attackers used the platform's Run Command feature to install rogue ScreenConnect remote-access clients on endpoints. In its updated report, Huntress counted at least 288 compromised endpoints at 48 organisations, all targeted within 90 minutes and roughly a third within the first 10 minutes.

Huntress believes the way in was RMM+, a third-party extension that lets external management tools interact with ScreenConnect sessions without going through the technician console. Versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 authenticated requests with a shared access key rather than a user account; if no key had been configured, the key stayed blank and an attacker could supply an empty one to pass the check. Huntress says this fits what it saw: commands executed across multiple ScreenConnect instances with no matching login activity, and logs tying those commands to RMM+.

ConnectWise disabled five extensions — Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link — across about 400 partner environments, stressing that an installed extension does not mean the environment was compromised. On 16 November it said its investigation was complete and that further activity is being reported against on-premises installations where the extensions are still enabled and ScreenConnect has not been updated.

SCKit and the attempted jump to technicians

Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber separately examined SCKit, a collection of 16 scripts and components. Blackpoint's Adversary Pursuit Group recovered the loader from attacker-controlled infrastructure and decrypted its later stages. The attackers first install extra ScreenConnect Access clients pointed at servers they control, so access survives the removal of the original MSP session.

The novel part is RelayTrap, which replaces the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest process on an infected endpoint and waits for a technician to open an interactive session. It is kept as C# source code, RelayTrap.cs, downloaded to the device and compiled locally by a PowerShell script; a companion component, TrapWatch, watches ScreenConnect services. RelayTrap then tries to exploit CVE-2026-84869, a critical client-side file-transfer flaw in the ScreenConnect client rated 9.9 and fixed in version 26.6.5, to send a file from the customer endpoint to the technician and have it run. From there, other components try to steal ScreenConnect authentication cookies from browsers and use the technician's permissions and the Shared Toolbox to push commands to further customers.

Neither firm has observed that chain working. Blackpoint tested the attempted exploit against a current client and the fix held. "The Guest side queued the transfer, but the current client never requested or ran the payload," researchers Sam Decker and Nevan Beal told BleepingComputer, adding that they had found no evidence of successful exploitation or of a bypass. Huntress said the console takeover failed in every recovered host log it reviewed. The recovered source code carries detailed explanatory comments and appears to Huntress to have been generated with a large language model.

Continued activity and persistence

The intrusion has not stopped. Huntress reported a further spike on 13 November affecting 205 hosts across 41 organisations, and said the new ScreenConnect client was hosted at 185.241.211[.]197, an address it links to 1337 Services GmbH, a hosting provider it describes as bulletproof and previously associated with malicious traffic. In one incident, a rogue client persisted as a service named Windows Update Agent, with UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe placed in C:\ProgramData\Windows Update Agent under the LocalSystem account.

ConnectWise advises that technician clients run version 26.6.5 or later and has asked partners not to re-enable or reinstall the disabled extensions until it gives further guidance. It also warns that the obvious fixes are not a full cleanup: "Disabling extensions and updating software do not remove unauthorized access or persistence already established on affected devices."

What is not known yet

  • Who is behind the attacks. No source attributes them to a named group or country.
  • How many organisations were affected in total. The 288-endpoint and 205-host figures come from Huntress's own visibility, not from a complete count.
  • Whether any technician workstation was actually compromised by RelayTrap, or whether every attempt failed as the two research firms observed.
  • Whether data was taken from customer endpoints or management consoles during the intrusions.
  • Whether the blank shared access key in RMM+ was the only entry route, or whether other paths into the affected environments were used.

What to do

If you run ScreenConnect, including on-premises

  1. Disable the five named extensions (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link) and do not re-enable or reinstall them until ConnectWise issues further guidance.
  2. Update the ScreenConnect client to version 26.6.5 or later; see ConnectWise's advisory for the full list of fixed versions.
  3. Look for unauthorised ScreenConnect Access clients and for services masquerading as system components, such as an executable named UpdateConnect.ClientService.exe under C:\ProgramData.
  4. Review Run Command and RMM+ activity in logs for commands with no corresponding user login, and treat persistence as still present even after patching.

If you buy remote support from an MSP

  1. Ask the provider whether it had any of the affected extensions enabled on your environments, and what it has found.
  2. Ask it to confirm its technician clients are on the fixed version before the next support session.

For everyone else

  1. Inventory third-party extensions and integrations attached to your remote-management tools, and remove any that are not in active use.
  2. Check that shared access keys on those integrations are actually set and are not left blank.
  3. Watch for remote-management agents installed outside change control, since these are what the attackers used to keep access.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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