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TeamUpdraft breach exposes UpdraftCentral keys used to backdoor WordPress sites

TeamUpdraft says an intruder reached its customer database over the weekend of 17-18 October, taking connection keys for its UpdraftCentral remote management service. Attackers have used those keys to install backdoor plugins on connected WordPress sites.

· First published

The short version

  • The breach. TeamUpdraft found unauthorised access to teamupdraft.com over the weekend of 17-18 October and believes the intruder read its customer database. The records include connection keys for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault and UpdraftClone, plus hashed passwords and two-factor authentication settings.
  • The backdoors. Attackers holding valid UpdraftCentral dashboard keys sent commands that installed malicious plugins on connected WordPress sites, opening administrator accounts. Patchstack counted 99 distinct backdoor plugin names; Nethemba says two of its own sites were compromised.
  • The scale. An estimated 10% of sites running UpdraftPlus hold an UpdraftCentral or Migrator key, which BleepingComputer says could put around 400,000 websites in reach.
  • The fix. TeamUpdraft released UpdraftPlus 1.26.13 (free) and 2.26.13 (Premium) to cut every UpdraftCentral connection made before 22:00 BST on 18 October. According to Nethemba, the earlier 1.26.12/2.26.12 release failed to remove UpdraftCentral Cloud keys because of a bug.

Timeline

DateEvent
17-18 OctTeamUpdraft identifies unauthorised access to the teamupdraft.com website over the weekend.
18 OctAttacks through UpdraftCentral begin at 15:32 UTC, according to Patchstack.
18 Oct, 22:00 BSTCut-off set by TeamUpdraft: UpdraftPlus 1.26.13/2.26.13 disconnects every UpdraftCentral connection made before this time.
18-19 OctThe backdoor campaign runs continuously through an 18-hour window, per Patchstack.
20 OctTeamUpdraft publishes its advisory.
21 OctThe breach and the backdoor campaign are reported publicly.

What TeamUpdraft says happened

TeamUpdraft, developer of the UpdraftPlus backup plugin and the UpdraftCentral remote management service, says it found unauthorised access to teamupdraft.com over the weekend of 17-18 October. It says it closed the access route, signed out every account and replaced keys and credentials that could have been affected. It believes the intruder reached its customer database, holding names, email and billing addresses, order history, hashed passwords, two-factor authentication settings and connection keys for UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault and UpdraftClone.

The company says it stores no payment details, which it says are handled by Stripe and PayPal. It says plugin files and downloads are unaffected, that self-hosted UpdraftCentral installations are not affected, and that backups in customers' own remote storage are untouched. It says it reported the incident to the UK Information Commissioner's Office and other authorities, rotated keys with payment providers, replaced UpdraftClone client keys and added monitoring.

How the stolen keys were used

The connection keys are what make the breach serious: UpdraftCentral is a remote management channel that sends signed commands to connected WordPress sites. Patchstack says an attacker holding valid dashboard keys issued commands to install plugins, starting at 15:32 UTC on 18 October and running through an 18-hour window into 19 October. Patchstack lead researcher Oliver Sild said the campaign may be more severe than the earlier "wp2shell" attack.

Nethemba, a Slovakia-based penetration testing firm that first detected the attack, says three of its own WordPress sites were targeted and malicious plugins were installed on two. It says all three ran current WordPress and UpdraftPlus versions. Nethemba said: "The attacker did not break into our servers and did not exploit any weakness in our configuration." The commands, it says, arrived through the UpdraftCentral channel signed with valid private dashboard keys.

Patchstack logged 99 distinct backdoor plugin names disguised as maintenance tools, among them Site Health Cache, and published account names and IP addresses to search for. Nethemba described a plugin that responds to a URL parameter carrying a token, then creates an Editor account with plugin-install rights; that account survives removal of the plugin and can log in through the normal form unless two-factor authentication is enabled on it. Wordfence has published its own analysis of which sites may be affected.

Who is exposed, and which version to install

BleepingComputer reports that an estimated 10% of sites running UpdraftPlus hold an UpdraftCentral or Migrator key, potentially around 400,000 websites. TeamUpdraft's own steps are set out in its advisory: update, delete the connection key from the site's own dashboard, check for unknown administrator accounts and plugins, and consider restoring from a backup taken before 17 October if anything suspicious is found.

The two reports differ on the version. The Hacker News relays TeamUpdraft's steps citing 1.26.12/2.26.12 or later; BleepingComputer, citing Nethemba, reports that the initial 1.26.12/2.26.12 release was meant to remove UpdraftCentral Cloud keys but a bug prevented it, and directs users to 1.26.13/2.26.13. Readers should check the vendor's advisory for the current release.

What is not known yet

  • Who carried out the intrusion into teamupdraft.com and the follow-on backdoor campaign.
  • How many TeamUpdraft customer accounts, and how many WordPress sites, were actually compromised.
  • Whether the intruder copied the whole customer database or only part of it.
  • Whether data was taken from the WordPress sites that received backdoors, beyond the rogue administrator accounts.
  • Whether the reported bug in 1.26.12/2.26.12 left UpdraftCentral Cloud keys usable, and for how long.

What to do

If you use UpdraftPlus with UpdraftCentral

  1. Log in to each site's own WordPress dashboard, not through UpdraftCentral, and update UpdraftPlus to the fixed release named in TeamUpdraft's advisory.
  2. Delete the UpdraftCentral connection key under Settings > UpdraftPlus > Advanced Tools > UpdraftCentral, then reconnect the site.
  3. Check Users for administrator accounts you do not recognise and Plugins, including the Must-Use tab, for unknown entries; remove them and change the passwords of all administrator accounts.
  4. Search logs and files for the indicators published by TeamUpdraft, Patchstack and Nethemba; if you find any, restore the site from a backup taken before 17 October.

If you have a teamupdraft.com account

  1. Change the password immediately, and anywhere else it was reused, and reset the two-factor authentication settings on the account.
  2. If a site was reached through UpdraftCentral, reauthorise remote storage and change its storage access keys.
  3. UpdraftVault users should reconnect their sites; UpdraftClone users with a client key should copy the new keys from the account area and pass them to their clients.
  4. Treat unexpected emails claiming to come from TeamUpdraft as suspect.

For everyone else

  1. Inventory the third-party services that hold keys able to send commands to your sites or systems, and delete connections you no longer use, because one stolen key can reach every system it was trusted by.

Update log

  • First published.

Sources

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