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Industry · Mobile, fixed-line and broadband operators

Telecom cybersecurity when a dealer’s PC is part of the perimeter.

An operator’s core network is the best-defended thing it owns. The credentials that open its dealer portals, contact-centre tools and identity provider are typed into machines it does not manage. ShadowMap reconstructs those infected machines from stealer logs, matches each credential to a login surface the operator owns, tests the ones it is authorised to test, and watches the brand its subscribers are phished under.

“The credentials that matter most sit on dealer and contact-centre machines we do not manage.”

12B+
Breach and credential records in the corpus
26
Stealer families tracked
290+
Ransomware leak sites tracked

A published engagement

57,300 leaked credential records, and the 23 that still worked

One mobile operator, anonymised and published in full. It is a single engagement, and the figures are its own.

Anonymised customer story, telecommunications

Stealer-log credential triage at a mobile operator

What the operator was receiving
Around 40,000 exposed credentials a month as one flat list. No field said whether a credential still worked, and nothing separated a staff identity from a franchise dealer or a consumer subscriber. Session cookies were absent from the report.
What reconstruction by machine showed
57,300 raw records collapsed to 11,900 unique identity and credential pairs across 287 infected machines. They split into three queues with three owners: 2,140 corporate identities, 1,470 dealer identities and 8,290 subscriber identities. 1,433 in-scope corporate and dealer credentials were tested against operator-owned endpoints only.
The published outcome
“Twenty-three rotations the same day, and a queue small enough to review weekly.” The act-now list ran to 41 items: 23 confirmed-working credentials rotated, 14 identity-provider session sets revoked and four shared dealer-portal logins retired in favour of per-user accounts.

Where the exposure sits

An operator is exposed through its dealers, its suppliers and its subscribers

Six places, each with the capability that covers it. None of them is the core network.

WhereWhat is exposed thereCovered by
Dealer and franchise outlets Logins to activation, SIM-replacement and dealer portals, typed into outlet PCs that sit outside the operator’s endpoint management and often shared between staff. Dark Web Monitoring
Artefacts are grouped by infected machine: credentials, cookies, tokens, autofill data and browser history, with an infection date.
The operator’s own login surfaces Single sign-on, webmail, the dealer portal and administrative consoles: the places a leaked credential is tried first. Continuous Automated Red-Teaming
Tested against operator-owned endpoints only, where it is safe and authorised. Every request carries an audit identifier you can reconcile in your own logs. No subscriber credential is tested and no session cookie is replayed.
Management and provisioning interfaces Device-management, provisioning and remote-support services that answer from the public internet, including the ones an acquired operator or a regional unit still runs. Attack Surface Management
Found from outside with no seed list, and rediscovered every 24 hours.
Suppliers Outsourced contact centres with access to subscriber records, managed-service partners with access to the network, and the equipment and software suppliers behind them. Third-Party Risk Management
Suppliers are scored with the same categories and bands as your own estate. Supplier-side findings arrive observed and untested.
The subscriber-facing brand Fake recharge, bill-payment and identity-verification pages, cloned self-care apps in third-party stores, and support accounts on messaging platforms answering in the operator’s name. Brand Protection
A confirmed impersonation ends in a removal request you authorise. Takedowns are unlimited, subject to fair use.
Subscriber data offered for sale Dump posts, leak-site listings and channel offers naming the operator, with or without a sample attached. Dark Web Monitoring
Each post is reported with its source and date. 290+ ransomware leak sites are tracked.

Dealer and franchise outlets

What is exposed there
Logins to activation, SIM-replacement and dealer portals, typed into outlet PCs that sit outside the operator’s endpoint management and often shared between staff.

Artefacts are grouped by infected machine: credentials, cookies, tokens, autofill data and browser history, with an infection date.

The operator’s own login surfaces

What is exposed there
Single sign-on, webmail, the dealer portal and administrative consoles: the places a leaked credential is tried first.

Tested against operator-owned endpoints only, where it is safe and authorised. Every request carries an audit identifier you can reconcile in your own logs. No subscriber credential is tested and no session cookie is replayed.

Management and provisioning interfaces

What is exposed there
Device-management, provisioning and remote-support services that answer from the public internet, including the ones an acquired operator or a regional unit still runs.

Found from outside with no seed list, and rediscovered every 24 hours.

Suppliers

What is exposed there
Outsourced contact centres with access to subscriber records, managed-service partners with access to the network, and the equipment and software suppliers behind them.

Suppliers are scored with the same categories and bands as your own estate. Supplier-side findings arrive observed and untested.

The subscriber-facing brand

What is exposed there
Fake recharge, bill-payment and identity-verification pages, cloned self-care apps in third-party stores, and support accounts on messaging platforms answering in the operator’s name.
Covered by
Brand Protection

A confirmed impersonation ends in a removal request you authorise. Takedowns are unlimited, subject to fair use.

Subscriber data offered for sale

What is exposed there
Dump posts, leak-site listings and channel offers naming the operator, with or without a sample attached.

Each post is reported with its source and date. 290+ ransomware leak sites are tracked.

What the sector answers to

Three texts that reach past the network to its suppliers and its edge

Each row quotes the text. The right-hand column is the dated record ShadowMap holds beneath it.

TextWhat it saysWhat the monitoring record shows
Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022, United Kingdom Regulation 7(1): a network or service provider must “take such measures as are appropriate and proportionate to identify and reduce the risks of security compromises occurring in relation to the public electronic communications network or public electronic communications service as a result of things done or omitted by third party suppliers”. The Code of Practice adds, at paragraph 2.98, that “public telecoms providers shall identify what equipment is in their exposed edge”. Each monitored supplier’s observed external posture, dated, and the operator’s own internet-facing management interfaces.
Source: Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2026 (version 1.1), gov.uk, which sets Regulation 7 out at paragraph 6.2, read 18 November 2026.
NIS2 Directive, European Union Recital 97 states that “it is important that all providers of public electronic communications networks have appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures in place and report significant incidents in relation thereto”. Article 23(4)(a) sets an early warning “without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident”. When an exposure was first observed and what it was attributed to: the dates an incident timeline is built from.
Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026.
Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Rules, 2024, India Notified on 21 November 2024 under section 22(1) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023. The Department of Telecommunications lists among their objectives “mandatory compliance for all telecom entities regarding directions and standards, including timelines for their implementation for ensuring telecom cyber security”. A dated record of external exposure and credential findings to set against each direction as it is issued.
Source: Department of Telecommunications, Telecom Cyber Security portal, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given entity is a determination for your compliance function. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion.

Electronic Communications (Security Measures) Regulations 2022, United Kingdom

What it says
Regulation 7(1): a network or service provider must “take such measures as are appropriate and proportionate to identify and reduce the risks of security compromises occurring in relation to the public electronic communications network or public electronic communications service as a result of things done or omitted by third party suppliers”. The Code of Practice adds, at paragraph 2.98, that “public telecoms providers shall identify what equipment is in their exposed edge”.
What the monitoring record shows
Each monitored supplier’s observed external posture, dated, and the operator’s own internet-facing management interfaces.

Source: Telecommunications Security Code of Practice 2026 (version 1.1), gov.uk, which sets Regulation 7 out at paragraph 6.2, read 18 November 2026.

NIS2 Directive, European Union

What it says
Recital 97 states that “it is important that all providers of public electronic communications networks have appropriate cybersecurity risk-management measures in place and report significant incidents in relation thereto”. Article 23(4)(a) sets an early warning “without undue delay and in any event within 24 hours of becoming aware of the significant incident”.
What the monitoring record shows
When an exposure was first observed and what it was attributed to: the dates an incident timeline is built from.

Source: Directive (EU) 2022/2555, EUR-Lex, read 18 November 2026.

Telecommunications (Telecom Cyber Security) Rules, 2024, India

What it says
Notified on 21 November 2024 under section 22(1) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023. The Department of Telecommunications lists among their objectives “mandatory compliance for all telecom entities regarding directions and standards, including timelines for their implementation for ensuring telecom cyber security”.
What the monitoring record shows
A dated record of external exposure and credential findings to set against each direction as it is issued.

Source: Department of Telecommunications, Telecom Cyber Security portal, read 18 November 2026. Whether a text binds a given entity is a determination for your compliance function. ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record, never a compliance opinion.

Questions buyers ask

Before you evaluate this

We already buy dark-web monitoring. What is different here?

The unit of analysis. A feed returns rows of email addresses and passwords. ShadowMap groups artefacts by the infected machine they were taken from, so a finding carries an infection date, the stealer family, and whether session cookies and tokens left with the password. Each credential is then reported as Confirmed Working, Maybe Working, Not Working or Not Tested. The collection is proprietary, and the raw source material is retained permanently.

Do you test our subscribers’ credentials?

No subscriber credential is tested, no third-party endpoint is tested and no session cookie is replayed. Validation runs against the operator’s own login surfaces for the staff and dealer identities you put in scope, and each request carries an audit identifier. Subscriber exposure is reported by recency of infection, so a fraud team can act on the recent ones.

Dealer machines are outside our endpoint management. What can we do with a finding there?

Act on the identity. A finding names the dealer login, the portal it opens and the date the machine was infected. In the published story the operator rotated the confirmed-working credentials, revoked the session sets and retired four shared dealer-portal logins in favour of per-user accounts.

Can ShadowMap tell us whether we meet a regulation?

ShadowMap holds the dated monitoring record: what was exposed, when it was first seen, what it was attributed to and when it closed. Whether a text binds a given entity, and whether its obligations are met, is a determination for your compliance function and its advisers.

See which of your leaked credentials still open something

Thirty minutes on your own domains: how many infected machines sit behind the credential count, and which queue each belongs in.